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I never even knew I was Mexican, I mean really Mexican. I
thought I was born in Magnolia or the East End, since that's all
I really remember. Except when my class went on a trip to
NASA, I've never really left Houston. Except we went to
Corpus [Christi] with my grandfather when the Aquarium
opened. So I thought all along I was Mexican American, you
know, Chicano, until "la IRCA"' came along. My mother took
me down to the "Migra,"2 and we waited in line with a green
bag full of papers, you know, with a twister tie on it like for
grass and leaves. That was when I found out I was really Mexi-
can, not Chicano. Born in Mexico. Except to talk to my grand-
father and that, I don't even speak Spanish very well. Now I'm
afraid to leave town, cause the "Migra" is, like, really coming
down on illegals. Now, it turns out I'm illegal even though I've
got my driver's license and that, even the SAT. If I'm illegal,
what about these Mexicans who stand around the corners? I
think the law should round them up, not me. I've been like a
citizen up to now. It was "la IRCA" that made me illegal, but
the lawyer said I could become a permanent resident and get a
green card. I thought I could vote when I was 18, but now I
* Michael A. Olivas is a Professor of Law and Associate Dean at the University of
Houston Law Center. He would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Lisa Luis,
Lorie Hutensky, and Helena Monahan. His research was partially undertaken at the invi-
tation of the Latino Eligibility Study Group of the University of California (UC). How-
ever, despite this financial assistance, no UC endorsement should be inferred.
1. IRCA is the popular name for the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
2. "Migra" is a derogatory term for the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
MADELAINE N. Rios, MANUAL OF IMMIGRATION TERMs 23 (Deborah Feizaig ed., 1984).
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have to become a citizen first. I'm gonna do it, but I'm not go-
ing to tell anybody, cause I want to go to college. I can go to
college, can't IV
It wasn't until they had the amnesty that I found out I wasn't
born in Texas. We grew up in Laredo, but my parents got di-
vorced and I moved to Houston with my mother and my sisters.
She doesn't speak English, but she wants me to go to school.
She cleans offices downtown, like law offices and a bank build-
ing. She can't help me with my homework, but she makes me
do it before [I can watch] TV. If I can go to college, it's because
she made me want to go. It's like for her. But now I found out
I'm mojado,4 but we're going to get legal papers. [The lawyer]
had me bring in my school grades to show that we were in the
U.S. before the time. My sisters knew we were mojados, but I
didn't. They said I was pocho,5 like tourists. But now I can go
to college, maybe be a lawyer or doctor.
6
... night [law] schools enrolled a very large proportion of for-
eign names .... [E]migrants [sic] covet the title [of attorney] as
a badge of distinction. The result is a host of shrewd young men,
imperfectly educated... all deeply impressed with the philoso-




In Rashomon, Akira Kurosawa's brilliant 1950 film, the same
event is told in four different ways by four different persons.
Moviegoers are drawn into the competing stories, and are left with no
clear resolution of which story is the most nearly true.8 The law is
often like this: trial lawyers argue that complex transactions are either
predatory pricing9 or just regular business practices, 10 or that the fail-
ure of the savings and loan industry was due either to vindictive,
3. Interview with Manuel H., in Houston, TX (Feb. 24, 1987).
4. "Mojado: Wetback [(derogatory)]." Rios, supra note 2, at 23.
5. "Pocho: Mexican-American, Chicano, Mexican born in the United States (deroga-
tory)." Rios, supra note 2, at 24.
6. Interviews with Jose G., in Houston, TX (Feb. 24, 1987).
7. SUSAN K. BOYD, TH ABA's FIRST SECTIoN: ASSURING A QUALIFIED BAR 17
(1993) (quoting Dean Harry S. Richard, University of Wisconsin Law School, and Chair,
ABA Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, 1908-1909).
8. R. AKUTAGAWA, In a Grove, in RASHOMON AND OTHER STORIES 19 (T. Kojima
trans., 1970).
9. Roger Parloff, Fare's Fair: Why the Predatory Pricing Case Against American Air-
lines Got to Trial - And No Further, AM. LAW, Oct. 1993, at 60.
10. Andrea Sachs, A Rare Loss for Joe Jamal, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at 16.
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harassing regulators" or massive industry greed.12 The best, most suc-
cessful, and widely admired trial lawyers are often world class racon-
teurs, able to tell their client's story in moving and cinematic fashion.'
3
At its core, law is storytelling.
This essay is about a Rashomon-like case. It is, alternatively, an
admissions case, an immigration matter, a taxpayer suit, a state civil
procedure issue, an issue of preemption, a question of higher educa-
tion tuition and finance, a civil rights case, and a political issue. In
addition to being a true story, it is also representative of the stories of
many other similarly-situated persons who seek admission to college.
From a social science perspective, this case is a subset of the admis-
sions cases, and a very specific subset at that: it is an immigration-
related admissions case. At bottom, though, it is a story about col-
lege-aged kids who have lived virtually all their lives in the United
States and who want to attend college and enjoy the upward mobility
a college degree provides.
Although this story has some of the attributes of the legal story-
telling associated with critical race theory, I do not believe it is truly in
that genre. That type of legal analysis, begun in the 1980s, has as its
aim to develop "outsider narratives," "counterstory jurisprudence,"
and to offer critical, alternative versions of stock legal stories. 4 This
story does not fit that description. If it were a more profound, synop-
tic, complex tale, this essay could be situated within the streams of
storytelling and counterstorytelling, structural determinism, and race,
sex, and class intersections - identified by the movement's bibliogra-
phers, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, as critical race theory
themes.' 5 However, it is actually a simple narrative, one that turns on
definitions, tainted by prejudice and misplaced scapegoating.
11. See e.g., Charles H. Keating, Jr., Quest for Truth: A Search for Sanity in a $500
Billion Tragedy, 2 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 147 (1990).
12. See, eg., Michael Waldman, The S & L Collapse: The Cost of a Congress For Sale,
2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 47 (1990).
13. See GERRY SPENCE & ANTHONY POLK, GERRY SPENCE: GUNNING FOR JUSTICE
(1982); see also RICHARD L. AHEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989).
14. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989); Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal
Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988). For
news stories about Critical Race Theory, see, e.g., Stephanie B. Goldberg, The Law, a New
Theory Holds, Has a White Voice, N.Y. TIMEs, July 17, 1992, at A23; Jon Wiener, Law
Profs Fight the Power, Tim NATION, Sept. 4, 1989, at 246.
15. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1258
(1992); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in Schook A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46
VAND. L. RPv. 665 (1993).
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The story is "about" college students, whose legal presence or
status in the United States is unauthorized or undocumented, and who
apply to or have been admitted to an institution of higher education.
Many colleges and universities will not admit undocumented students
at all. There are some public institutions, however, that will admit
them, but have barred them from claiming in-state residency status.
As a result, dozens of postsecondary residency/alienage cases have ap-
peared on state court dockets.16 Unfortunately, these cases have not
clarified the issue, though, because their rulings have not been uni-
form. This has been the case despite the fact that the United States
Supreme Court has ruled on several dozen residency and domicile
cases, 1 7 including the near identical issue of charging tuition to un-
documented school children in K-12 public schools.' 8 The Court has
not ruled directly on this issue and the result has been a range of deci-
sions from the state courts. 9 In addition, several higher educational
systems have acted to accommodate the undocumented, exercising
their traditional academic freedom to determine for themselves who
shall attend their institutions, adding yet another factor to this already
complicated equation.
In order to fully understand these cases, one must recognize that
they have been decided against a background of mounting xenopho-
16. See e.g., Gurfinkel v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 175 Cal. Rptr. 201
(1981) (higher education not a fundamental right); Leticia "A" v. Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. (Leticia "A." I), No. 588982-4 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cty. May 30, 1985)
(undocumented students can establish residency), clarified in, Leticia "A" v. Board of Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. (Leticia "A." II), No. 588982-4 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cty.
May 19, 1992); Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Ct. (Bradford II), 276
Cal. Rptr. 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (undocumented aliens not eligible to become resi-
dents); American Ass'n of Women v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. St. Univ. (AAW), No.
BC061221 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Cty. Sept. 28, 1992) (undocumented aliens not eligible to
become residents). See generally Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, Toll v. Moreno, and
Postsecondary Admissions: Undocumented Adults and "Enduring Disability," 15 J.L. &
EDUC. 19 (1986) [hereinafter Olivas, Enduring Disability]; Peter Roos, Postsecondary Ply-
ler, University of Houston, Institute for Higher Education Law and Governance, Mono-
graph 91-7 (1991).
17. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (183); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982);
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
18. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
19. Judith A. v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, No. 87-21579 (Az. Super. Ct., Maricopa Cty.
Nov. 24, 1987) (undocumented aliens may become residents); Alarcon v. Board of Trustees
of the Univ. of Ill., No. 87-Ch. 02858 (Ill. Cir. Div. July 14, 1987); William O'Connell,
College University Attendance by Out-of-Status and Undocumented Students (Feb. 1992)
(New York state survey of college residency practices) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author). For an analysis of the academic freedom dimensions, see Michael A. Olivas,
Reflections on Professorial Academic Freedom: Second Thoughts on the Third "Essential
Freedom," 45 STAN. L. REv. 1835 (1993); see generally Roos, supra note 16.
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bia and immigration restrictions, the modem day responses to the
story and reality of the United States as a nation of immigrants. These
reactions are not surprising, given that economic downturns have his-
torically led to scapegoating alien workers, whether in legal status or
not, where these individuals are said to be stealing jobs from citizen
workers.20 This has been particularly apparent in California, where a
sluggish economy in the 1990s and a related contraction of the coun-
try's largest state higher education systems have contributed to the
public outcry against the state's substantial Asian and Latino immi-
grant populations.21 Thus, this story is also necessarily about preju-
dice and retrenchment.
In general, the higher education system in the United States is
one of the things we do right. The vast system, with over 3300 col-
legiate campuses, offers a variety of elite, highly competitive, selective
institutions, as well as many easily accessible, inexpensive community
colleges and open door institutions.22 American higher education at-
tracts students from all over the world, enrolling more than 400,000
international students in 1991,23 as well as many others who were for-
eign-born but have since become permanent residents or citizens. By
a wide margin, United States colleges admit more foreign students
than those in any other country in the world.' In some fields of
20. For examples of scholarship documenting public reaction and the scapegoating
phenomenon, see THOMAS MULLER, IMMIGRANTS AND THE AMERICAN CITY (1993); ALAN
DowTY, CLOSED BORDERS: THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
(1987); RITA J. SIMON, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE IMMIGRANT. PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE,
1880-1980 (1985) (reviewing negative media coverage of immigrants in newspapers and
magazines). For a recent story on how immigrants fit into a community, see Deborah
Sontag, New Immigrants Test Nation's Heartland, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1993, at Al, Cll
(immigrants who "do the plant's dirty work presented no economic threat").
21. For some sample articles on this issue, see Frank Acosta & Bong Hwan Kim, Race-
Baiting in Sacramento, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1993, at B7; Scott Armstrong, California Melt-
ing Pot Boils Over As Illegal Immigrants Enter State, CHmsTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 6,
1993, at 1; Tim Ferguson, California Feels Anti-Immigrant Tremors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29,
1992, at A10; William Hamilton, Harvest of Blame: Californians Turn on Illegal Immi-
grants, WASH. POST, June 4, 1993, at Al.
22. There is a life's worth of reading on this topic. Some of the better works in this
genre include ALICE CHANDLER, OBLIGATION OR OPPORTUNITY, FOREIGN STUDENT POL-
ICY IN SIX MAJOR RECEIVING COUNTRIES (1989); BRUCE JOHNSTONE, SHARING THE
COSTS OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1986); MAUREEN WOODHALL, STUDENT LOANS AS A
MEANS OF FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION: LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL ExPERI-
ENCE (1983); INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, OPEN DOORS, 1990/91: REPORT
ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE (1991).
23. See Alice Chandler, Looking at Trendlines: Foreign Student Issues For the 90's 1
n.1 (May 18, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on fie with author).
24. Id. (noting France, the country with the second highest number of foreign students,
had only 132,000 foreign students in 1991).
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study, particularly in the sciences and engineering, a high percentage
of graduate students are foreign born. In 1992, for example, 58% of
all engineering PhD's, 32% of all life sciences PhD's, and 43% of all
physical sciences doctorates in the United States were awarded to
noncitizens with either a permanent or temporary visa.25 Compara-
tively, the number of undocumented students seeking admission to
United States colleges is very small, but the fierce competition for the
scarce openings in some of the California institutions has helped to
cast the admission of these students as a matter of displacement of
both Anglo students and citizen students of color.
Having won legal permission to enroll, to establish residency, and
to pay in-state tuition, in a series of cases in the 1980S,2 6 undocu-
mented students received a blow in 1991, when a California Court of
Appeal case, Board of Regents of the University of California v. Supe-
rior Court (Bradford II), held that undocumented students could not
establish residency.27 It is important to note that because of the size28
of the California postsecondary educational system and the geograph-
ical location2 9 of the state, California's policies and related legal deci-
sions have a disproportionately heavy impact on the national
undocumented alien population. As a result, it is not surprising that
this single state appellate court decision had a huge national impact.
This is not to say that there are not some differences between the way
various states handle undocumented students. In contrast to Califor-
nia, New York State has been more accommodating of these students,
as have both Arizona and Illinois. 30 Texas, on the other hand, has an
25. Denise K. Magner, Blacks Earned Fewer Doctorates in 1992 Than in 1991, Study
Finds, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 29, 1993, at A18.
26. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 321
(1983) (holding states may regulate undocumented aliens who commute or reside in dis-
trict for sole purpose of attending schools); Leticia "A" I, No. 588982-4, slip op. at 2 (May
7, 1985).
27. Bradford II, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 200-02 (holding California may preclude undocu-
mented alien students from qualifying as residents for tuition purposes); see also AAW, No.
BC061221 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Cty. Sept. 28, 1992) (states may preclude undocumented
aliens from establishing domicile); see also infra notes 216-271 and accompanying text.
28. The University of California (UC), the California State University System (CSU),
and the California Community College System (CCC) comprise nearly 150 campuses and
1.5 million students. THE AmAs OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 209 (Table 2.4)
(James Fonseca and Alice Andrews eds., 1993).
29. Nearly 40% of the undocumented aliens in the United States are believed to reside
in California. Deborah Sontag, Analysis of Illegal Immigrants In New York Defies Stereo-
types, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1993, at All.
30. See supra note 19 (referring to interpretations of the provisions in Arizona, Illinois
and New York allowing the undocumented to establish residency).
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uneven record due to its decentralized higher education systems.3 As
the other major destination for undocumented college students, Texas'
policies also have a broad impact on the national immigrant
population.
This story, therefore, is also one about administrative and regula-
tory law: of residency statutes, agency implementation, and adminis-
trator discretion. Above all, however, this story is about eighteen to
twenty-two-year-olds, whose birthplace was, quite literally, an acci-
dent of birth; individuals who have resided in and lived in the United
States virtually all their lives, who have vied successfully in a highly
competitive admissions process, only to find themselves constructively
precluded from attending colleges into which they have been
admitted.32
This article proceeds as follows. Part I is, of course, introductory.
Part II thoroughly investigates the residency system in postsecondary
education. Every state has enacted a tuition scheme to differentiate
between residents and nonresidents, who pay substantial tuition dif-
ferentials.33 In many states, this mechanism is used to deny undocu-
mented aliens - even those who meet all the traditional tests for
establishing domiciles - the opportunity to pay in-state resident tui-
tion. Part II describes the basic legal and fiscal operations of resi-
dency requirements, with special emphasis upon alienage issues;
distinguishes "residence" from "domicile" for alien students; catego-
rizes state governance mechanisms for determining residency and ex-
emptions; and reviews problems with current institutional practices.
Part III examines how courts have addressed the problems of res-
idence and domicile for the undocumented students. It traces the de-
velopment of two judicial themes: first, some courts have held that
undocumented students cannot meet the traditional test for establish-
ing residence since their very presence in this country is unauthorized;
31. Olivas, Enduring Disability, supra note 16 (study of Texas requirements); see also
Richard Padilla, Immigration Status and Residency Determination for Tuition Purposes,
University of Houston, Institute for Higher Education Law and Governance, Monograph
91-4 (1991); Nestor P. Rodriguez, Undocumented Immigrant Students and Higher Educa-
tion: A Houston Study, University of Houston, Institute for Higher Education Law and
Governance, Monograph 90-10 (1990).
32. For example, a student who leaves one state for another may sever all ties with the
former state, yet not meet the residency durational requirements in the new state. For
tuition purposes, this leaves many students with no verifiable formal residence in either
state. For one such example, see Frame v. Residency Appeals Comm., 675 P.2d 1157 (Utah
1983) (married couple unable to establish Utah residency after foreign study period).
33. See Patricia M. Lines, Tuition Discrimination: Valid and Invalid Uses of Tuition
Differentials, 9 J.C. & U.L. 241 (1982-83).
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a second, mutually exclusive theme is that other courts have con-
cluded that these students are, in fact, entitled to establish their domi-
cile if they meet all the durational and intentional criteria required of
all transient students.
Part IV briefly examines the social science of undocumented
alien students, including ethnographic studies and extensive case his-
tories. Here, I analyze the judicial themes through individual stories,
noting how the telling of the same tale from different perspectives can
result in different endings, or "morals" of the stories. I then attempt
to use the individual data and research findings to answer the objec-
tions of those opposed to granting resident status or even admission
under any circumstances to undocumented alien college students. In
this account, aliens are characterized as having positive features and
posing no genuine threat to the polity. This narrative draws from the
extensive literature on college choice. Part V concludes that the
higher education enterprise is enriched and strengthened by the ad-
mission of alien college students. Finally, a brief note incorporates
reference to Proposition 187, the recent anti-alien initiative enacted in
California, and its treatment of college admissions.
I write from the perspective that the admission of undocumented
students into college has been improperly cast as a complex geopoliti-
cal act when, in fact, each instance is a personal transaction. Being
undocumented does not always mean the students have done anything
wrong. Treating these individuals on their own academic merits and
credentials acknowledges the complexity of the undocumented's posi-
tion in a multicultural society, and recognizes that talent should tran-
scend cartography.
H. The Law and Policy of Residency Requirements
Public colleges draw distinctions between resident and nonresi-
dent students on the premise that public institutions should be avail-
able at lower costs to those taxpayers and their families whose money
supports the colleges. The result is that nonresidents, who do not pay
state taxes are required to pay a higher share of the costs.34 These
differentials can be quite substantial: for example, in the 1994-95
34. For this discussion of residency, I draw from earlier research on the subject, includ-
ing: Michael A. Olivas, State Residency Requirements: Postsecondary Authorization and
Regulation, 13 C.L. DIG. 157 (1983); Michael A. Olivas, Administering Intentions: Law,
Theory, and Practice in Postsecondary Residency Requirements, 59 J. HIGHER EDuc. 263
(1988) [hereinafter Olivas, Administering Intentions]; and Michael A. Olivas, The Political
Economy of Immigration, Intellectual Property, and Racial Harassment" Case Studies of the
Implementation of Legal Change on Campus, 63 J. HIGHER EDUC. 570 (1992).
school year, the ratio between nonresident and resident tuition at the
University of Houston, Texas, was approximately six to one.35 At the
University of California in 1993, undergraduate nonresidents paid
three times the tuition and fees that California residents were re-
quired to pay.36
This power to set residency policies and tuition rates is well-es-
tablished. Court cases dating back to 1882 have clearly held not only
that states can charge these differentials,37 but that they may decide
which students are entitled to be classified as residents and which are
not.38 In most situations this procedure works well enough because
state institutions spell out the basic residency requirements and stu-
dents seem to understand the rules. Officials in most states have real-
ized that a mix of in-state and out-of-state students is desirable, and
therefore, have made it possible for students to migrate to public col-
leges as long as the higher tuition costs "equalize" the tax burden
upon residents.39 The balance properly favors resident taxpayers, yet
does not fence out those nonresidents who wish to attend schools in
that state. This arrangement acts as an incentive for states to establish
strong public postsecondary sectors. The state has an incentive to do
so to prevent a mass migration to states with lower fees and to engen-
der loyalties, both political and academic, to those state institutions.
By means of compacts and state consortia agreements, states can also
distribute scarce places in highly specialized and expensive curricula,
such as optometry, pharmacy, and veterinary medicine, where not all
35. For example, at the University of Houston, a public institution, tuition for each
undergraduate semester hour was $28 for residents in 1994-95, while the charge was $171
for nonresidents. UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON, GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL STUDIES 26
(1994-96). See also Joyce Mercer, Many States Toughen Policies on Non-Resident Students,
Raising Tuition and Stiffening Residency Requirements, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 2,
1993, at A18.
36. Telephone interview with Manuel Gomez, Associate Vice Chancellor, University
of California at Irvine (Oct. 10, 1993). There have been unanticipated consequences of the
UC tuition hikes, even for the more well-to-do and citizen populations. Louis Freedberg,
Neighboring States Benefit from Exodus, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 3,1993, at Al (describing steep
rise in California residents attending colleges in other states). For a reaction to this phe-
nomenon, see UNIvERsrrY OF CALIFORNIA, UC OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE EFicr
OF FEE INCREASES ON NEW CALIFORNIA RESIDENT FRESHMAN ENROLLMENT AT THE UNI-
VERSITY OF CALIFORNIA: FALL 1990 TO FALL 1992 (1993).
37. Wisconsin ex rel. Priest v. Regents of the Univ., 11 N.W. 472 (Wis. 1882) (uphold-
ing institution's right to charge out-of-state surcharge).
38. See generally Olivas, Administering Intentions, supra note 34.
39. Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CFIL L. REv.
487 (1981); James N. Morgan, Tuition Policy and the Interstate Migration of College Stu-
dents, 19 RES. I-hGHER EDUC. 183 (1983).
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states offer such programs.40 The practical application of residency
policies, however, lacks the elegance of its theoretical premise. In a
surprisingly large number of situations, applicants or students have
presented increasingly sophisticated residency claims that were not
anticipated by the state legislatures. The result has been inconsisten-
cies in the way the rules are applied. Since there are a comparable
number of factual permutations when it comes to immigration issues,
similar problems arise with respect to undocumented aliens.
By employing several approaches, this Part reviews the law, the-
ory, and administration of residency requirements. First, I outline ba-
sic operational definitions of the legal and fiscal issues, including the
vexing problems of "domicile" and "residence." Second, I categorize
the governance structures of the states according to their formality
and level of decisionmaking. The result is a comparison of the various
state practices through an analysis of their similar residence require-
ments. Third, I discuss the extensive system of exemptions, excep-
tions, and waivers to the residency rules. One commentator has noted
that this elaborate set of rules and regulations is a patchwork which
has resulted in a dissimilarity of treatment that has given rise, not only
to inconvenience to the participants, but to injustice. The commenta-
tor further concluded that "this heterogeneity is neither in the interest
of the students, of the states, nor of the nation."41 Fourth, I discuss
the problems with institutional practice; there is considerable adminis-
trative discretion at the institutional level in the indices and criteria of
residential intent, the burden of persuasion, the evidentiary require-
ments, and the weight accorded the various criteria.
In many respects, these requirements are troubling: the residency
statutes, regulations, and practices are often confusing and illogical;
potential students "forum shop" among colleges and exploit technical
loopholes; and many statement-of-intent criteria are difficult to ad-
minister or verify and these flaws in the system invite circumvention
and dishonesty. Moreover, these complex technicalities often work
against aliens, who do not always have the requisite paperwork or
documents for establishing their residence. In addition, the immigra-
tion categories themselves are often a bramblebush of conflicting defi-
nitions and technical distinctions.
40. See, e.g., Olivas, Administering Intentions, supra note 34; David Palley, Resolving
the Nonresident Student Problem: Two Federal Proposals, 47 J. HIGHER EDUC. 1 (1976);
ROBERT CARBONE, ALTERNATVE TuITION SYSTEMS (1974); ROBERT CARBONE, STU-
DENTS AND STATE BORDERS (1973) [hereinafter CARBONE, BORDERS].
41. ROBERT CARBONE, RESIDENT OR NONRESIDENT? TUITION CLASSIFICATION IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 2 (1970).
Persons who have lived in a single state for many years are easily
defined as residents. Conversely, a student who moves from State A
to State B solely for the purpose of attending State B college is clearly
a nonresident, at least at first. The wide space between these two situ-
ations, however, is the problem. As a general rule, states will allow a
person who moves to a state to become reclassified as a resident after
a specified period of time. This time period ranges from ninety days
to twelve months, the period used by nearly all the states.42 In several
states (for example, New York43 and Tennesseenn), it is possible to be-
come reclassified immediately upon arrival.
Absent other exceptions or complications, when the specified
time passes, the eight states45 with a simple durational requirement
will allow a citizen student to pay the lower tuition as a resident. This
is usually an objective standard with certain proof about continuous
presence required for the reclassification. To be sure, this objective
standard is subject to measurement problems, since even the seem-
ingly simple standard of counting a particular number of days can be-
come complicated: Do holidays away from the state count? Does the
"clock" begin when the person moves to the state? When s/he obtains
employment? When s/he registers to vote? When s/he buys a house?
It is easy to imagine many possible variations on these themes, and an
experienced registrar is bound to have heard them all.
As difficult as this "objective" measurement becomes, forty states
have complicated matters by requiring more than mere duration:
these states also require that residents establish domicile, which en-
tails forming the legal intention of making that state their "true, per-
manent, and fixed abode.146 This is a very complicated requirement,
both conceptually and operationally. Instead of merely counting days
in the requisite waiting period (already noted as deceptively compli-
cated), states that employ domicile also require a legal declaration and
42. D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-601 (1993); see, eg., Olivas, Administering Intentions, supra
note 34, at 287-90 (app. I).
43. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 680(1)(c) (McKinney's 1995); see Olivas, Administering Inten-
tions, supra note 34, at 287-90.
44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-8-102(c)(2) (Michie 1994); see Olivas, Administering Inten-
tions, supra note 34, at 287-90.
45. ALASKA STAT. § 14.40.170(a)(6) (Univ. of Alaska); HAw. REv. STAT. § 304-4; ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 144, para. 190 (Smith-Hurd 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-12-1-1 (Bums
1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-729 (1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § (West 1988); Mo. REv.
STAT. § App. B 6-2 (1978); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 396-540.
46. See generally Christopher T. Corson, Reform of Domicile Law for Application to
Transients, Temporary Residents and Multi-Based Persons, 16 COLuM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS.
327 (1981).
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evidence to prove that residents consider the state their principal es-
tablishment. Confusion frequently arises because the terms "resi-
dence" and "domicile" are often used interchangeably or "residence"
is measured with language denoting intentionality, which is generally
not required for mere residence.4 7 As a point of law, "domicile" in-
cludes "residence," but has a more specific meaning than does
"residence."'
To establish a domicile, students must prove two elements: (1)
residence and (2) an intention to make that residence their permanent
home. Persons may maintain more than one residence, but only one
domicile.4 9 For example, many students plausibly maintain several
residences, some simultaneously (summer state, mother's and father's
state, the state in which they live and vote). Incidentally, the place
where students vote is not necessarily their domicile, as mere resi-
dence and brief waiting periods are therequirements to register for
voting in local or federal elections.50 As difficult as the concept of
domicile is for United States citizens, it is even more difficult in the
immigration context.
Given the high degree of confusion in ascertaining student inten-
tions, why do states employ domicile as a determinant of residence?
The logic is threefold: 1) to ensure, as effectively as possible, that stu-
dents establish and maintain genuine ties to the state; 2) to ensure that
students do not "forum shop" between several states where they can
manufacture or allege contacts; and 3) to make the declaration of resi-
dence more meaningful and seriously considered than mere presence
requires. Taken individually, these intentions do not always substan-
tially advance the state interests, except through the attendant com-
plexity that discourages (to a limited extent) frivolous claims and
thereby protects the states' fiscal resources. This unarticulated prem-
47. Id
48. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFLicr OF LAWS § 11(2) ("Every person has a
domicil [sic] at all times and, at least for the same purpose, no person has more than one
domicil [sic] at a time.").
49. Id; see also Gary S. Josephs, A Checklist for Determining Domicile, PRAc. LAW.,
July 15, 1981, at 55; Adam B. Schiff, Comment, State Discriminatory Action Against Non-
residents: Using the Original Position Theory as a Framework for Analysis, 22 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 583 (1985).
50. Id.; see also Josephs, supra note 49; Joseph A. Bollhofer, Comment, Disen-
franchisement of the College Student Vote: When a Resident is Not a Resident, 11 FoRDHAM
U"B. L.J. 489 (1983) (reviewing voting practices affecting students who live in campus
housing).
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ise appears to be a strong driving force behind several residency poli-
cies or practices.'
To make matters worse, forty states require the establishment of
domicile and a waiting period,52 while an additional two states require
domicile with no specified durational period. 53 This leaves nine states
with pure durational requirements. Upon closer examination, how-
ever, the rationales for the widespread practice of exacting declara-
tions of intention fail to advance any substantial guarantees for
establishment of domicile beyond those provided by mere durational
requirements. The cost of administering intentions is high, both in
dollar terms and in the considerable ill will it exacts. None of the
three ostensible reasons for domiciliary requirements truly guarantees
loyalty or tax contributions. In fact, none of the three rationales for
strict domiciliary requirements assures states that the newly arrived
nonresidents have been transformed into genuine residents.54 This is
as true for citizens as it is for undocumented aliens. First, the fact that
students establish a legitimate principal home and abode does not
guarantee that they will remain in the state beyond commencement or
contribute to the tax system while they are enrolled in school. In all
likelihood, students will move wherever employment is available or
the quality of life, family considerations, and circumstances allow.
Through the use of domicile requirements, states may achieve the sec-
ond goal of preventing "forum shopping" since students cannot main-
tain more than one domicile. However, a variety of permutations is
possible for students, since they can maintain more than one legal res-
idence, which can give sufficient evidence for students to meet resi-
dency requirements in more than one state.55 A greater problem is
the possibility that students may have to relinquish residence or domi-
cile in the "home" state to establish sufficient contacts in a new state.
51. Interview with University of Houston residency officer (Oct. 8, 1993) (identity
withheld upon request); see generally Lines, supra note 33; Varat, supra note 39.
52. Interview with University of Houston residency officer (Oct. 8, 1993) (identity
withheld upon request); see generally Lines, supra note 33; Olivas, Administering Inten-
tions, supra note 34, at 287-90; Varat, supra note 39.
53. Olivas, Administering Intentions, supra note 34, at 287-90 (Tennessee and New
York).
54. For example, because the intent requirement cannot be measured or enforced until
after the educational resource is consumed (i.e., after graduation or the completion of stud-
ies), the true measure is likely to manifest too late. In an earlier work, I proposed a time-
shifting alternative that would tie tuition benefits to a rebate after the completion of stud-
ies. Olivas, Administering Intentions, supra note 34, at 284-85.
55. For example, a student could simultaneously establish residence in one or more of
the following: the "home state," the school state, the parents' state(s), a holiday or sum-
mer job location.
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This has led, in many instances, to students having no one state in
which they can successfully claim a domicile for tuition purposes.
56
The third rationale, making declarations more meaningful, is only ex-
hortatory and unlikely to prove efficacious in determining domicile,
since there is no legal means to force students to remain in the state
after consuming the postsecondary resources.
Despite the demonstrable defects of domiciliary requirements,
particularly those that also include waiting periods, states and institu-
tions persist in requiring them. In addition, more than lower resident
tuition lies in the balance. Many other benefits may accrue to state
residents in public or private colleges, such as preferential admissions,
scholarship or loan assistance, inclusion in quota programs, eligibility
for consortia or exchange programs, and participation in specialized
programs negotiated among states in legislative compacts.57 It is these
stakes, not merely the tuition differentials (which, in certain instances,
can be "equalized" by federal need-based aid formulae) that have
contributed to the overall rise in residency litigation.
To complicate matters, there is an extraordinary number of ex-
emptions, exceptions, and waivers to state residency practices. 58 The
most common factors singled out for special treatment include:
whether an individual is a dependent or minor, what their marital sta-
tus is, whether they are military personnel, and what their alienage is.
These are four areas which receive some type of special consideration
in nearly all states. States employ special treatment for a wide range
of categories, resulting in thousands of exceptions to residency re-
quirements. Other groups frequently singled out for special treatment
include university employees (seventeen states), financially needy stu-
dents (sixteen states), and senior citizens (ten states). Table 1 summa-
rizes state data on special treatment, but as complicated as these
practices are, this table significantly understates the exemptions. For
example, in the seventeen states with institutional autonomy to devise
their own residency requirements, only a flagship system or campus
was sampled; the residency requirements in those states vary from in-
56. See, e.g., Frame v. Residency Appeals Comm., 675 P.2d 1157 (Utah 1983).
57. See, e.g., CARBONE, BORDERS, supra note 40. For example, with only fourteen
schools of optometry in the United States, the University of Houston School of Optometry
reserves a set number of places for residents of other states and the states are forced to
"contract" with the University for those places in each year's class. Interview with Dr.
Enrique Mendrano, University of Houston, Houston, TX (Jan. 6, 1994).
58. Michael A. Olivas, Postsecondary Residency Requirements: Empowering Statutes,
Governing Types, and Exemptions, 16 C.L. DIG. 268 (1986) [hereinafter Olivas, Postsecon-
dary Requirements].
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stitution to institution, as do the exemptions from these rights. These
exemptions are undoubtedly even more widespread than the data sug-
gest, due to the different ways the legislatures confer exemptions and
ways these rules are applied. For example, states may use fiscal riders,
revenue bills, or appropriations language to enact exceptions (for one
year or several), and these or other quasi-legislative means could not
be discovered in a statute search. As one example, Texas uses an ap-
propriations bill each session to limit out-of-state enrollments in pub-
lie law schools to a certain percentage of their total.5 9
TABLE 1








Other misc. provisions (33 categories) 173
Source: Olivas, Postsecondary Requirements, supra note 58, at
Table 2, App. II.
The most striking feature among these patterns is how few ex-
emptions or special treatment have anything to do with the fundamen-
tal concepts of duration or intention. In some instances, the
exceptions are aimed at classes of persons who are mobile, for in-
stance, military or migrant workers, or for whom domicile is difficult
to determine, as with children or Indians.61 However, the largest class
is those for whom residency (or tuition waivers) is a conferred benefit,
without reference to duration or intent. Although the data in Table 1
are not arranged to show each state's exemptions (due to the wide
number of exceptions), some states are truly spectacular in their leger-
demain around strict requirements. For example, Texas offers more
than eighteen categories of exceptions or special treatment to a strict
domiciliary requirement with a one year waiting period including
59. See Michael A. Olivas, Invited Testimony to Texas House of Representatives,
Committee on Higher Education (March 11, 1985) (transcript on file with author).
60. Each state could, and many did, have more than one provision per category. As a
result, the totals are higher than 51 (50 states and the District of Columbia).
61. Olivas, Postsecondary Requirements, supra note 58; J. Youngblood Henderson,
The Question of Nonresident Tuition for Tribal Citizens, 4 AMER. IND. L. REv. 47 (1976)
(analyzing residency classifications that conflict with domicile determinations for reserva-
tion Indians).
Summer 19951
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:1019
graduate assistants, recipients of "merit" scholarships, and certain
border nonresidents.62 In nearly every instance, the benefit is con-
ferred to reward a desirable characteristic or a favored class of per-
sons, such as graduate students (as an employment perquisite),
meritorious students, certain fortunate employees, or residents of cer-
tain adjoining states.63 Ironically, in other respects, the Texas legisla-
ture has sought to make state residency even more difficult to achieve,
especially for undocumented aliens residing within its borders.' 4
Some of these exemptions may not pose bad results, but they are,
for the most part, unprincipled, except when they ease the evidentiary
burden upon groups for whom duration or domicile genuinely poses a
particular problem. Graduate students rarely are paid well and cer-
tainly provide important instructional or research services to institu-
tions. Paying their tuition seems a modest benefit and one well worth
preserving, but using the residency requirement to deem the students
"residents" is a curious bookkeeping maneuver, one that undermines
the residency determination system. Particularly troubling are the
many discretionary means to confer residency upon the advantaged,
as, for instance, when the state confers residency exceptions to its em-
ployees or to children of employees of choice industries. 65 The growth
of such arbitrary and unprincipled exceptions, exemptions, and waiv-
ers undermines the already weak scheme erected to regulate the mi-
gration of out of state students.
On the one hand, it is understandable that exceptions would oc-
cur and desirable that some flexibility is available for the institutions
that must administer these strict residency requirements; play in the
62. See Olivas, Invited Testimony, supra note 59; TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN., §§ 54.052,
54.059, 54.063 (West 1995). For an extreme example, Texas provides nonresident tuition
waivers for federal prisoners incarcerated in Texas correctional facilities, provided the in-
mate designates a Texas domicile. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. H-559 (March 20, 1975).
63. For a good example of the waivers for the fortunate few, see recent certifications
registered under TEx. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 54.052(h) (West 1995): employees (and fami-
lies) of Citicorp (August 16, 1993); Venture Stores (July 30, 1993); Southwestern Bell
Telecom (August 2, 1993); and Menasco Aerosystems (August 3, 1993) (on file with
author).
64. In April 1993, a bill was introduced in the Texas Legislature to address the
problems of intending permanent residents or persons permanently residing under color of
law (PRUCOL) but it died in committee. See H.B. No. 2510 Introduced Version, 73rd
Reg. Sess., April 28, 1993 (on file with author). For excellent studies of PRUCOL aliens,
see Peter L. Reich, Public Benefits for Undocumented Aliens: State Law Into the Breach
Once More, 21 N.M. L. REv. 219 (1991); John W. Guendelsberger, Equal Protection and
Resident Alien Access to Public Benefits in France and the United States, 67 TUL. L. REv.
669 (1993); Robert Rubin, Walking a Gray Line: The "Color of Law" Test Governing
Noncitizen Eligibility for Public Benefits, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 411 (1987).
65. See supra note 63.
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joints is always useful for large organizations, and reasonable accom-
modations seem to be a social good. On the other hand, the extensive
and unprincipled exemptions in this area have gone far beyond their
original purpose. They suggest that the basic residency requirements
are so outmoded or wrongheaded that only irregular institutionalized
circumvention can make the system work. '6 This Goldbergian scheme
is neither rational nor reasonable, and institutional practices, dis-
cussed next, only add to the confusion.
The first step in understanding these discretionary practices is an
examination of the indices and criteria used to implement residency
requirements. 67 As has been noted, domiciliary requirements entail
subjective as well as objective measures of evidence. In the purest
sense, one who has never left a state and never intends to leave incon-
testably meets all the presence, duration, and intent criteria. At the
other end of the spectrum, someone who has never been in a state and
never intends to go there is just as clearly not its domiciliary. Between
these two points, however, there is much room for judgment. In most
instances, the first inquiry is: do the circumstances indicate any pres-
ence in the state, and if so, was it for a sufficient time to meet the
durational requirement? As simple as this appears to be, counting the
time periods, as noted, frequently poses problems: When does the
clock start? When does it stop? Do absences from the state count? If
so, how long can I be out of the state and still establish it as my domi-
cile? A review of admissions practices reveals that nearly half the
sampled institutions require that applicants for residence status reside
in the state for the appropriate period, as counted backwards from the
date of application, on the theory that events could change between
that time and the time of enrollment; the other states permit students
to run the clock until enrollment, a practice that can substantially
shorten the waiting period.68
The measurement of intent is even more inexact than the mea-
surement of duration, and the forty-two states with domiciliary re-
quirements predictably employ a wide range of criteria to determine
the concept.69 Often, other measures of long-term residence and com-
munity ties are used: for example, voter registration is widely used by
institutions to indicate students' intent. In truth, it is a poor proxy
66. See, eg., Olivas, Administering Intentions, supra note 34, at 276-78 (likening prac-
tices to "one-hoss shay").
67. The following discussion of discretionary practices was taken from my previous
work, Administering Intentions, supra note 34.
68. Olivas, Enduring Disability, supra note 16, at 42-44.
69. Olivas, Administering Intentions, supra note 34, at 287-90.
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because durational residency requirements for voting are required by
law to be of short duration, usually between ninety days to six months,
and rarely are probative of long-term intent.70 People may regularly
vote in their domicile, but they need not do so. Conversely, not being
registered to vote in a new state is likely to be interpreted as not hav-
ing established domicile. In any event, the extensive litigation in stu-
dent voting fights cases suggests the great degree of difficulty in
measuring intentionality for meeting voting residency requirements.7'
However, every state sampled either allowed or required voter regis-
tration as a criterion of domiciliary intent.
The problems of evidence and burden of proof are important for
determining both objective facts (for example, how long have students
resided in the state) and subjective intent (where is their true, perma-
nent, and fixed abode), but those states that hold students to dura-
tional standards appear to exact the same evidentiary requirements as
those states where domicile must be proven. Therefore, even where
subjective intent is not required, similar proof - including items that
measure intentionality - is exacted.72 This curious finding suggests
that even nondomiciliary states are employing domiciliary criteria and
evidence, creating higher standards than the technical requirements of
the statutes or regulations.
The kinds of evidence allowed to prove residence or domicile are
summarized in Table 2, data gathered in a survey of all state practices.
The data show a remarkable consistency, for nearly every state re-
quired or allowed the following as evidence: Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) returns; automobile registration or other tax records,
property ownership, voter registration card; paycheck stubs; affidavits
from landlords, employers, or others; students' sworn statements;
transcripts; and other documents, testimony, or proof of residence.
70. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (striking down one year voter registration
residency requirement); see also Bollhofer, supra note 50.
71. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 333-36 & nn. 3-6 (reviewing difficulties in residency determina-
tions and cases requiring reasonable accommodations).
72. Olivas, Administering Intentions, supra note 34, at 274-77 (analyzing problems of
evidence and burden of proof in residency/domicile determinations).
TABLE 2
Documentation Allowed or Required by States as
Evidence or Residency or Domicile
Evidence No. of States73
IRS returns, W-2, W-4, state tax returns 51
Voter registration 51
Driver's license 48
Car or property papers 48
Proof of housing (rental or owned) 48
Payroll checks, stubs 45






Source: Olivas, Postsecondary Requirements, supra note 58, at
Table 3.
Many states grant wide latitude in the evidence which is required
to prove residence, but it is the patterns of the evidence that adminis-
trators rely upon to make their determination. For instance, a student
holding all the documentation listed in Table 2, but voting in another
state, will likely be classified a nonresident; even if the student regis-
tered to vote in the new state, many registrars would likely start the
clock at the point of reregistration. The burden of proof is always
upon the student in classification cases, and courts will likely uphold
such a state practice unless it includes an irrebuttable presumption
(that is, that students, once classified nonresidents, can never become
residents) 74 or an unconstitutional provision, which attempts to do
what only the federal government can do, such as regulate immigra-
tion.75 Thus, to overcome the burden of proof, students will not only
be required to show that they are residents or domiciliaries of the
state, but that they are not domiciliaries or residents of any other
state. These are heavy burdens to overcome, and although the re-
quirements for duration are less stringent than those for domicile, the
evidence deemed necessary for one is no less than that required for
the other.
73. 50 states and the District of Columbia.
74. The leading "irrebuttable presumption" case arose in the area of postsecondary
residency requirements. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (striking down irrebuttable
presumptions in out-of-state college applications).
75. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1982) (striking down state college residency re-
quirement for G-4 aliens on preemption grounds).
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The weight accorded the evidence does not substantially differ
between determinations of residence or domicile. In both instances,
states rely upon similar evidence and accord the evidence the greatest
weight when the records show uninterrupted presence and abandon-
ment of domicile elsewhere. As noted earlier, even durational re-
quirement determinations have elements of intentionality, and taking
into account the whole picture inevitably considers intentions. The
care with which materials are scrutinized can depend on a range of
elements, including political or legal considerations. For example,
even in those institutions that enjoy considerable autonomy in resi-
dency matters, admissions numbers and policies can subtly affect
whether or not institutional strict scrutiny is applied to residency peti-
tions; when enrollments are down or when substantial tuition in-
creases occur, it may prove efficacious for institutions to be more
lenient in borderline residency cases rather than risk losing students.76
If a school has differential admissions practices for transfer students
- requiring higher GPA's for transfer admissions than those required
for enrolled students - such flexibility may actually be a way to im-
prove the quality of students. Of course, such practices cannot be ar-
ticulated as formal institutional policy, lest state auditors investigate
or students begin to expect easier reclassification in the future.
There are also occasions where institutions reinterpret state legis-
lation or regulations, as in one state, where a virtually unenforceable
provision of dubious constitutionality was ignored by the state institu-
tions in an unspoken compact.77 This has also happened in states
where the existing practice has been struck down by a court decision.
One study found a number of states whose laws regarding alien stu-
dents had not been brought into conformity with a United States
Supreme Court postsecondary residency decision, several years after
such requirements had been found unconstitutional.78 Institutional
officers were aware of the court case and had been advised by legal
76. Interview with University of Houston residency officer, Houston, TX (Sept. 8,
1993) (identity withheld upon request).
77. The requirement was that a Texas resident be "gainfully employed." TEx. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 54.052(e) (West 1995). This requirement has been finessed to mean "sub-
stantially," "more than part-time," "non-work study," or "not a public charge" (i.e., not on
welfare). Telephone interviews with registrars and residency officers at various Texas pub-
lic institutions throughout Spring 1993, all of whom requested that their names be
withheld.
78. See Olivas, Enduring Disability, supra note 16, at 36-55. The practice was the
treatment of G-4 alien students.
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counsel to ignore the formal state requirements and abide by the
Court's decision.79
The fluctuations of enrollments, institutional priorities, and legal
criteria all contribute to the accordion-like tightening and loosening of
the evidentiary requirements, burdens of proof, legal standards, and
discretionary factors in residency determination. Like the multiple ex-
emptions found in nearly all states, the wide swings evident in the ad-
ministration of residency suggest the deterioration of the system into
one that does not always protect either the institutions' interest or the
students' rights. As troubling as the system is for citizens simply mov-
ing to a new state, the calculus for aliens, particularly undocumented
aliens, is even more complex.
M. Courts, Colleges, and Undocumented Aliens:
Plyler Goes to College
Plyler v. Doe8" stands at the apex of immigrants' rights in the
United States. With this decision, the Court struck down Texas' at-
tempt to deny free public education to alien children.8 ' The Texas
statute denied state funds to school districts enrolling children who
79. Id
80. 457 U.S. 202 (1982), affg Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), affg Doe v.
Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978). For careful studies following the decision, see
Jos6 A. CArdenas & Albert Cortez, The Impact of Plyler v. Doe Upon Texas Public
Schools, 15 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (1986) (finding Plyler had a "minimal" impact upon Texas
schools, with a greater impact upon urban areas and certain border districts); Manuel Gar-
cia y Griego, The Rights of Undocumented Mexicans In The United States After Plyler v.
Doe: A Sketch of Moral and Legal Issues, 15 J.L. & EDuC. 57 (1986) (reviewing normative
obligations to undocumented aliens in the United States).
81.
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens
and who are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on the first
day of September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the
Available School Fund for that year.
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a legally
admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21
years on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall
be permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he resides or
in which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides
at the time he applies for admission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall
admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are
either citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over
five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such
persons or his parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within the
school district.
TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.03 (Vernon Supp. 1981), cited in Plyler, 457 U.S. at 201 n.1.
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were not "citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens.
'82
Justice Brennan, in his majority opinion striking down the statute,
characterized the Texas argument for charging tuition as "nothing
more than an assertion that illegal entry, without more, prevents a
person from becoming a resident for purposes of enrolling his children
in the public schools. '8 3 He employed an equal protection analysis to
find that a state could not enact a discriminatory classification "merely
by defining a disfavored group as nonresident." 4 He then considered
and dismissed arguments proffered by Texas in support of the chal-
lenged statute.
Justice Brennan easily dismissed the State's first argument that
the classification or subclass of undocumented Mexican children was
necessary to preserve the State's "limited resources for the education
of its lawful residents. '8 5 A similar argument had been raised and
rejected in Graham v. Richardson,86 where the Court held that the
concern for preservation of state welfare resources could not justify an
alienage classification used in allocating those resources.8 7 Further-
more, the district court in Plyler8 made factual findings that the ex-
clusion of all undocumented children would only eventually result in
some small savings to the state, 89 but that since both state and federal
governments based their allocations to schools primarily on the
number of children enrolled, those savings would, at best, be uncer-
tain. The court further found that barring those children would "not
necessarily improve the quality of education." 90
82. Id It is not surprising that such anti-Mexican legislation would have originated in
Texas, a jurisdiction widely regarded to have "a legacy of hate engendered by the Texas
Revolution and the Mexican American War." GUADALUPE SAN MIGUEL, "LET THEM
ALL TAKE HEED": MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR EDUCATIONAL
EQUALITY IN TEXAS, 1910-1981 (1987); see generally ARNOLDO DE LE6N, THEY CALLED
THEM GREASERS (1983). According to historians, this history of conflict has
generated distrust and dislike between Anglos and Texas Mexicans. Most impor-
tantly, it shaped Anglo attitudes towards Mexicans by (a) justifying the inferior
status to which they were relegated, (b) legitimizing the stereotype of Mexicans as
"eternal enemies" of the state, and (c) encouraging their denigration. Addition-
ally this legacy undergirded the historical attitude of Anglo disparagement of
Mexican culture and the Spanish language.
SAN MIGUEL, supra note 82, at 32 (citing RODoLFo ACUNiA, OCCUPIED AMERICA 3-23
(1981)).
83. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
87. Id at 375. The classification involved state welfare benefits. Id. at 366.
88. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
89. Id. at 576-77.
90. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229 (citing Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 577).
The State also argued that it had enacted the legislation to protect
itself from a putative influx of undocumented aliens.91 The Court ac-
knowledged the concerns of the State, but found that the statute was
not tailored to meet the stated objective: "Charging tuition to un-
documented children constitutes a ludicrously ineffectual attempt to
stem the tide of illegal immigration...."92 Further, the Court noted
that immigration and naturalization policy is within the exclusive pow-
ers of federal government.93 A state may enact legislation affecting
aliens only if 1) the power to regulate in this area is delegated to the
states, 2) the law mirrors federal policy, and 3) the statute furthers a
legitimate state goal. The Court found no conceivable educational
policy or any state interests that would justify denying undocumented
children an education.
94
Finally, the State maintained that undocumented children were
singled out because their unlawful presence rendered them less likely
to remain in the United States and, therefore, less likely to use the
free public education they received to contribute to the social and
political goals of the United States community. 95 The Court distin-
guished the subclass of undocumented aliens who live in the United
States as a family from the subclass of adult aliens who enter the coun-
try alone and whose intent is to earn money and stay temporarily.
96
The Court went on to state that for those who reside in the United
States with the intent of making it their home, "[i]t is difficult to un-
derstand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the
creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our bound-
aries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, wel-
fare, and crime."
'9 7
As in many equal protection cases, an important issue in Plyler
was the level of scrutiny to be accorded the Texas statute. Undocu-
mented aliens, prior to Plyler, had won constitutional protection in
Fourth,9" Fifth,9 9 and Sixth 1°° Amendment cases, as well as in a range
91. Id. at 229-30.
92. Id. at 228 (citing Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 585).
93. Id. at 225-26.
94. Id. at 226 ("We perceive no national policy that supports the State in denying these
children an elementary education.").
95. Id. at 229-30.
96. Id. at 230.
97. Id.
98. United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1975) (undocumented alien
has standing to assert Fourth Amendment violation).
99. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (all aliens are "persons"
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
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of civil litigation.' 0' However, the Supreme Court had never been
faced with the question of whether undocumented aliens could seek
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. 0 2 The Supreme Court had
earlier held that undocumented aliens are "persons' 0 3 protected by
the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 4 How-
ever, the State of Texas argued that, because undocumented children
were not "within its jurisdiction,"' 0 5 they were not entitled to equal
protection. Justice Brennan rejected this line of reasoning, drawing
upon the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment,'06 and
concluding that there "is simply no support for [the] suggestion that
'due process' is somehow of greater stature than 'equal protection'
and therefore available to a larger class of persons."' 0 7
Once he had determined that undocumented aliens were entitled
to equal protection, Justice Brennan decided upon the degree of scru-
tiny the case required. He discarded strict scrutiny, noting that un-
documented aliens were not a "suspect class"' 0 8 and that education
was not a "fundamental right."'0 9 He also rejected the minimal scru-
tiny inherent in a two-tiered standard."10 Instead, he chose the "inter-
mediate scrutiny" standard of Craig v. Boren,"' and found that the
67, 81 (1976) (permanent residents and parolees protected by the Fifth Amendment from
invidious discrimination by the federal government).
100. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238 (all persons within territory of United States entitled
to the protection of Sixth Amendment).
101. Torres v. Sierra, 553 P2d 721, 724 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976) (undocumented alien is
"person" within meaning of Wrongful Death Act); Arteaga v. Literski, 265 N.W. 2d 148,
149 (Wis. 1978) (undocumented aliens may bring suit in personal injury actions); Ayala v.
California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 126 Cal. Rptr. 210, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(eligibility of undocumented aliens for disability payments).
102. "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XV §1.
103. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 228.
104. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,369 (1886) (Fourteenth Amendment provisions
"are universal in their application, to all persons.").
105. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 211.
106. Id. at 214 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 213. In the dissent, Chief Justice Burger concurred that the Equal Protection
Clause applies to undocumented aliens. Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 219 & n.19. The Supreme Court did not address the issue of preemption.
For a review of the current state of preemption doctrine, see Michael A. Olivas, Preempt-
ing Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT'L
L. 217 (1995).
109. Id. at 221.
110. Id. at 223-24.
111. 429 U.S. 190 (1976), cited in Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 n.16; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at
218 n.16, 224. ("Only when concerns sufficiently absolute and enduring can be clearly
ascertained from the Constitution and our cases do we employ this standard to aid us in
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statute did not advance any "substantial state interest,""' 2 thus af-
firming the district and appellate courts' judgments invalidating the
statute.13
To reach this conclusion, Justice Brennan was forced to stretch
both the suspect classification and the fundamental right rationales.
Though he rejected undocumented alienage as a suspect class, by
analogizing undocumented alienage to legitimacy classifications," 4
Justice Brennan concluded that undocumented children were not re-
sponsible for their own citizenship status and that treating them as
Texas law envisioned would "not comport with fundamental concep-
tions of justice.""' However, he was more emphatically concerned
with education and elaborating the nature of that putative entitle-
ment. While he reaffirmed San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez" 6 in finding public education not to be a fundamental
right,"17 he recited a litany of cases holding education to have "a fun-
damental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.""18 Moreover,
he felt that "[i]Uiteracy is an enduring disability,""i 9 one that would
disadvantage the individual and society. This analysis enabled him to
rebut the State's assertions, which the Burger dissent had found per-
suasive, that the policy was legislatively related to protecting the fiscal
economy of the State' 2 0
The role of education in national policy-making seems to have
been a more important factor to the Plyler Court than it had been to
the Rodriguez Court. 2' Further, while Justice Brennan did not reach
the claim of federal preemption, 22 he did draw a crucial distinction
between what states and the federal government may do in legislating
determining the rationality of the legislative choice."); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 17 (1972).
112. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 220 (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)).
115. Id.
116. 411 U.S. 1 (1975).
117. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
118. Id. (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 222.
120. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 & n. 19 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)).
121. Id. at 221-22 (construing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Abington
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76, 77
(1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
122. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982), in contrast, turned on
preemption.
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treatment of aliens.12 Additionally, while the Court has upheld state
statutes governing alien employment'" and welfare benefits, 125 these
narrow areas mirrored federal classifications and congressional action
governing immigration. 126 For example, in De Canas v. Bica,127 the
Supreme Court held that if Congress had addressed an immigration
issue and delegated aspects of its administration to states, the states
could enact their own legislation to regulate the area. 28 In the area of
public education, however, Justice Brennan wrote, "we perceive no
national policy that supports the State in denying these children an
elementary education.'
' 29
The framework employed by the majority in Plyler, couched as it
was in moral tones, seems to be the very type of "legislating" then-
Justice Rehnquist feared in Craig v. Boren, the earliest use of height-
ened scrutiny.130 The Court in Plyler could have found undocumented
alienage of children to be a suspect classification or, more satisfacto-
rily, provided criteria for measuring the "enduring disability."' 3' Had
the Court articulated those standards the legislatures could have fash-
ioned more acceptable ends-means formulations for their statutes.
Heightened scrutiny may have developed from either or both of two
different lines of legal reasoning: one suggested by Judge Seals in In
re Alien Children Education Litigation,32 which apparently was not
considered by the Court but was discussed in the Rodriguez case;
33
and a second, an outgrowth of race, national origin, and alienage cases
in which the Court employed stricter scrutiny.
34
123. Id- at 224.
124. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
125. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
126. See, &g., 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (1988); and 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988).
127. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
128. Id at 356.
129. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226.
130. 429 U.S. 190, 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). At the time, Justice Rehnquist was
the only member of the Burger Court who had not approved the use of the heightened or
intermediate scrutiny standard.
131. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222.
132. 501 F. Supp. 544, 582 (S.D. Tex. 1980). This case was later consolidated with the
Plyler litigation. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 209.
133. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37 ("Whatever merit appellees' argument might have[,] if a
State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any
of its children, that argument [would not prevail in this setting]." (emphasis added)).
134. For example, in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), the Supreme Court struck
down a residency requirement that necessitated a five year wait for a Medicare benefit
using intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 86. While this case is widely regarded as having import
for the condition of permanent residents, the plaintiffs also included two parolees. Id. at
69-71. Parolees, who have not even effected an entry into the United States, may physi-
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In In re Alien Children, Judge Seals applied "strict judicial scru-
tiny" in his district court opinion, "when the absolute deprivation [of
education] is the result of complete inability to pay for the desired
benefit. ' 135 Such a standard would have required the State show a
"compelling governmental interest."'1 36 In contrast to the Rodriguez
fact pattern, which involved a concededly unequal funding base for
Texas minority school children but did not constitute "an absolute
deprivation,' 37 the charges to undocumented aliens were substan-
tial.13 8 The district court had found "the effect of the new statute is to
exclude undocumented children from the Texas public schools.'
1 39
Therefore, one of the "fundamental right" ingredients, missing in
Rodriguez, the denial of minimum access to education, was present in
Plyler.
Another way in which the Supreme Court could have employed
strict scrutiny was to hold that undocumented alien children are a
"suspect class." Justice Brennan categorized these classifications as
reflecting "deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in
pursuit of some legitimate objective."' 40 Although the record seemed
replete with such animus towards undocumented aliens in Texas,' 4' he
found that undocumented entry is "the product of voluntary ac-
tion" 42 and therefore "not irrelevant to any proper legislative
goal.' 43 This reasoning, while arguably applicable to the parents, was
repudiated by Justice Brennan himself as inapplicable to undocu-
cally reside here. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(5)(1988); see also Matter of Castellon, 17 I. & N. Dec.
616, 619-20 (1981) (analyzing discretionary nature of parole). Undocumented aliens, in
contrast, have entered the United States, giving rise both to an ability to establish domicile
and to the right to a deportation hearing if apprehended and given a show-cause order by
immigration officials. While Mathews, absent more, does not render the undocumented
eligible for Medicare provisions, they have made more of an entry than have parolees. For
excellent discussions of alien eligibility, see NAT'L IrmMGRATnON LAW CTR., infra note 270,
at 36-39; Janet M. Calvo, Alien Status Restrictions on Eligibility for Federally Funded Assist-
ance Programs, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soa CHANGE 395 (1987-88).
135. In re Alien Children, 501 F. Supp. at 582 (citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973)).
136. Id.
137. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
138. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 571 ($1000 per year in "Tyler Independent School District).
139. In re Alien Children, 501 F. Supp. at 555.
140. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14.
141. See e.g., Jorge C. Rangel & Carlos M. Alcala, Project Report De Jure Segregation
of Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 307 (1972); Guadalupe Salinas &
Isaias D. Torres, The Undocumented Mexican Alien: A Lega4 Socia and Economic Anal-
ysis, 13 HOUS. L. REV. 863, 865 & n.4 (1976); see generally SAN MIGUEL, supra note
82; DE LEON, supra note 82.
142. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
143. Id. at 220.
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mented children.'" The children's surreptitious entries were not ef-
fected voluntarily by the children; in traditional domicile terms,
children's domiciles are those of their parents. 45 Justice Brennan
failed, therefore, to provide an internally consistent reason for not
holding that these children were members of a suspect class.
Justice Brennan also could have reviewed the classification in
light of the Court's previous national-origin and alienage cases.
14 6
When read together, these cases provide a considerable record of the
"deep-seated prejudice" so manifestly evident in Texas' and other
states' treatment of undocumented aliensj 4 7 The Court identified the
scrutiny due aliens generally in two other cases the same term, with
which Plyler Would have been consistent had it adopted a more
searching standard of review."
In 1982, the Court decided Toll v. Moreno.1 49 Toll was the first
postsecondary residency case construing a state statute affecting non-
immigrants and aliens with permission to remain only temporarily in
the United States.' Justice Brennan also wrote the majority opinion
144. Id. ("[L]egislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children
does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice."). He also suggests that being
undocumented is not an "absolutely immutable characteristic," as aliens may seek reclas-
sification; this would also not apply for children who cannot themselves seek reclassifica-
tion. Id.
145. Josephs, supra note 49; see also Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 325-30 (1983)
(reviewing residence and domicile of undocumented aliens).
146. See generally Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (race and national origin
classification are suspect); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage classifica-
tion is independently suspect); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin
classifications are suspect); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See also Juan F.
Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrimination Under Title
VII, 35 WM. & M. L. REv. 805 (1993-94).
147. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
148. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982)
(citizenship is "not a relevant ground for the distribution of economic benefits"); see also
Bernal v. Fainter, 476 U.S. 216 (1984) (alienage as suspect class).
149. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982). This case went through several different incar-
nations. The following is a complete history of the Toll case: Moreno v. University of Md.,
420 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1976), affd without op. sub nom., Moreno v. Elkins, 556 F.2d 573
(4th Cir. 1977), question certified, 435 U.S. 647 (1978), certified question answered, sub
nom., Toll v. Moreno, 397 A.2d 1009 (Md.), answer conformed to, 441 U.S. 458 (per
curiam), on remand, 480 F. Supp. 1116 (D.Md. 1979), later proceeding, 489 F. Supp. 658 (D.
Md. 1980), affd sub nom., Moreno v. University of Md., 645 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1981)(per
curiam), affd sub nom., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
150. Id at 1-3. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), was the first Supreme Court
postsecondary education case construing a state statute affecting permanent resident col-
lege students. Nyquist struck down a New York State statute that prohibited permanent
resident aliens from receiving college tuition assistance benefits. Id. at 12.
in Toll. After reviewing the confusing history of the case,-51 Justice
Brennan struck down the University of Maryland's policy of denying
domiciled treaty organization individuals, or "G-4" aliens, the oppor-
tunity to pay reduced, in-state tuition on Supremacy Clause' 52
grounds.'5 3 The Court therefore did not reach the questions of due
process or equal protection, which had been considered by both the
district' 54 and appellate courts. 55 The Supreme Court based its opin-
ion on the premise that the federal government is preeminent in mat-
ters of immigration policy and states may not enact alienage
classifications, except in limited cases of political and government
functions. 56
In 1976, when the case was first brought, the district court held
that the original policy denying residency was a violation of due pro-
cess and constituted an irrebuttable presumption.5 7 In reviewing that
case, the Supreme Court noted that it had previously held in 1978 that
G-4 visa holders could be United States domiciliaries,' 58 and had cer-
tified a question to the Maryland Court of Appeals to determine
whether G-4 aliens and dependents could be Maryland domiciliar-
ies.'5 9 The Maryland court determined that these individuals were ca-
pable of acquiring domicile,'160 thus rendering the University's
previous reliance upon nonestablishment of domicile incorrect. How-
ever, before the Supreme Court could render its opinion on this inter-
pretation, the University's Board of Regents issued a "Reaffirmation
of In-State Policy.' 6 ' That statement actually constituted a substan-
tial retreat from its previous position, although it still did not allow
residency tuition for Moreno. 162 The Supreme Court, noting that the
University's action had "fundamentally altered" the domicile issue, re-
manded the case to the district court.
63
151. Toll, 458 U.S. at 310; see also Olivas, Enduring Disability, supra note 16, at 29-33
(reviewing the several Toll cases).
152. In pertinent part: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States... shall be
the supreme Law of the Land .... ." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
153. Toll, 458 U.S. at 17, 20.
154. Moreno v. Toll, 489 F. Supp. 658 (D. Md. 1980).
155. Moreno v. University of Md., 645 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
156. Toll, 458 U.S. at 13-17, 20.
157. Moreno v. University of Md., 420 F. Supp. 541, 544, 548, 554 (D. Md. 1976).
158. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978).
159. Id. at 668-69.
160. Toll v. Moreno, 397 A.2d 1009, 1019 (Md. 1979).
161. Toll v. Moreno, 441 U.S. 458 (1979) (per curiam).
162. Id
163. Id. at 461-62.
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On remand, the University lost once again. The district court
held that, though domicile was no longer of "paramount considera-
tion," the revised policy was defective on Equal Protection and
Supremacy Clause grounds. 164 In the lower court's view, the "re-
vised" policy concerning alienage (which made domicile only one of
several criteria) could not survive strict scrutiny,165 and further, it im-
permissibly encroached upon federal immigration prerogatives.1
66
The appellate court affirmed on the same grounds. 67 Thus, though
Justice Brennan's opinion in Toll only reached the issue of the
Supremacy Clause,' 68 his opinion in Plyler, decided upon equal pro-
tection grounds with less-than-strict scrutiny for undocumented
aliens,'169 suggests that he also would have found the revised policy in
Toll invalid on equal protection grounds as well.
In Toll, Justice Brennan reviewed Takahashi,70 Graham,'17 1 and
De Canas,72 reading them for the principle that "state regulation[,]
not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens law-
fully admitted to the country[,] is impermissible if it imposes addi-
tional burdens not contemplated by Congress.'1 7 He found both that
Congress had allowed G-4 visa holders to establish domicile in the
United States, 74 and also had conferred tax exemptions upon G-4
aliens "as an inducement for these [international] organizations to lo-
cate significant operations in the United States." 75 Therefore, Justice
Brennan reasoned, it was clearly the congressional intent that G-4 visa
holders not bear the "additional burdens" Maryland sought to impose:
"The State may not recoup indirectly from respondents' parents the
164. Moreno v. Toll, 489 F. Supp. 658 (D. Md. 1980).
165. Id at 668.
166. Id. at 667-68.
167. Moreno v. University of Md., 645 F.2d 217, 220 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
168. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1982).
169. Plyler, 458 U.S. at 230; see generally supra notes 80-148 and accompanying text
(discussion of Plyler).
170. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (states cannot impose
discriminatory burdens on aliens), cited in Toll, 458 U.S. at 10-11.
171. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (states may not impose regulations
upon aliens if the burdens are not contemplated by Congress), cited in Toll, 458 U.S. at 12.
172. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (Court upheld state law regulating employ-
ment of undocumented aliens), cited in Toll, 458 U.S. at 13.
173. Toll, 458 U.S. at 12-13 (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 358 n.6). Justice Brennan
agreed that the Court had previously upheld legislation limiting the "participation of
noncitizens in the States' political and governmental functions." Id. at 12 n.17 (citations
omitted).
174. Id at 14.
175. Id at 16 (citations omitted). Moreover, Maryland law tracked the federal exemp-
tion. See id at 15 n.22.
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taxes that the Federal Government has expressly barred the State
from collecting."176
On the merits of the case, Brennan mustered a seven to two vote,
with Justice O'Connor concurring in the result. 177 Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion' 78 was aimed at rebutting the dissent by then-Jus-
tice Rehnquist that argued at length that treaty organization aliens
should not be strictly scrutinized, as they were an advantaged group,
not the disadvantaged aliens envisioned as requiring protection in
Graham v. Richardson.179 Additionally, then-Justice Rehnquist found
the majority's preemption analysis flawed:
First, the Federal Government has not barred the States from
collecting taxes from many, if not most, G-4 visa holders. Sec-ond, as to those G-4 nonimmigrants who are immune from state
income taxes by treaty, Maryland's tuition policy cannot fairly
be said to conflict with those treaties in a manner requiring its
preemption.1 0
Then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent does not help clarify the
problems glossed over in the majority opinions. First, it is not disad-
vantage per se that provokes the need for strictly scrutinizing alienage
statutes, but rather aliens' conceded powerlessness in political dis-
putes.' 8 ' Treaty organization aliens, like all other nonimmigrant
classes, cannot vote or participate in the electoral process. However
wealthy or advantaged World Bank employees may be (and these
plaintiffs surely could not invoke the same moral claims as did un-
documented alien children),18 the University's additional charges for
nonresidents clearly constituted a burdensome extra cost which the
176. Id at 16. Justice O'Connor dissented from this characterization, but concurred in
the opinion "insofar as it holds that the state may not charge out-of-state tuition to nonim-
migrant aliens who, under federal law, are exempt from both state and federal taxes, and
who are domiciled in the State." Id. at 24. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
177. Id. at 24-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the result).
178. Id. at 19-24 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
179. Id at 29-30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (construing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971)).
180. Id. at 33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted).
181. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (early retirement age for Foreign
Service officers held not to violate equal protection component of the Due Process Clause
of Fifth Amendment); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (Civil Service Com-
mission regulation which barred noncitizens from employment was invalidated).
182. See Gerald P. L6pez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immi-
gration Law and Policy 28 UCLA L. REv. 615 (1981); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONsT. COMMENTARY 9 (1990) (ex-
amining discrepancies in treatment of aliens in equal protection theory); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862 (1989)
(criticizing judicial deference toward immigration legislation); Gerald M. Rosberg, The
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University was ultimately required to refund.183 Moreover, in at-
tempting to suggest that the Maryland tuition policy was not in con-
flict with the State's tax exemption,' 4 Rehnquist was simply wrong.
Not only did the University concede openly that the surcharges were
calculated in an attempt at "granting a higher subsidy" and "achieving
equalization,"'' 8 5 both of which are tax terms, but in their brief the
University noted that the nonresident tuition differential was "roughly
equivalent to the amount of state income tax [a G-4 alien] is spared by
[the state] treasury each year.'
'1 86
What Rehnquist might have queried was the extent to which pub-
lic universities may appropriately regulate their admissions policies
concerning residence, particularly policies concerning foreign nation-
als following Toll. A significant number of states have residency re-
quirements that functionally resemble Maryland's practice. Not all
have granted G-4 alienage tax exemptions. Given the complexity of
administration in foreign student affairs, it is likely that many adminis-
trators in public and private universities frequently do not understand
their legal responsibilities to foreign nationals who apply for admis-
sion, in-state tuition, or state financial assistance.'8 7 Therefore, the
majority's broad language 88 is unhelpful to guide admissions officers
in drafting acceptable guidelines. For example, how can a state uni-
versity "track" relevant federal immigration statutes in admissions
and financial aid, so as to meet the requirements of the preemption
doctrine? How may states regulate tuition charges for other similarly
situated nonimmigrants who are not G-4 aliens?" 9
Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 Sup.
Cr. REv. 275 (1977) (same).
183. Toll, 458 U.S. at 17-18.
184. MD. Rv. CODE ANN., TAx-GEN. § 280a (1977).
185. Toll 458 U.S. at 7 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 173a-174a).
186. Toll, 458 U.S. at 16 (quoting Brief for Petitioners 23).
187. Olivas, Enduring Disability, supra note 16; NATIONAL ASS'N OF FOREIGN STU-
DENT ADVISORS, ADVISER'S MANUAL OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AFFECrING FOREIGN
STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS (Alex Bedrosian ed. 1992) [hereinafter NAFSA].
188. "[W]e cannot conclude that Congress ever contemplated that a State, in the opera-
tion of a university, might impose discriminatory tuition charges and fees solely on account
of the federal immigration classification." Toll, 458 U.S. at 17.
189. IRCA provided additional independent nonimmigrant status for relatives of em-
ployees of international organizations, or long-term (16 years or more) G-holders. 8
U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(N) (West 1995); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(I) (West 1995). See, e.g.,
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (State financial aid program requirement cannot
compel resident alien to become citizen). See generally, Comment, An Alien's Constitu-
tional Right to Loan, Scholarships and Tuition Benefits at State Supported Colleges and
Universities, 14 CAL. W. L. REv. 514 (1979).
Read with Plyler, Toll raises several important questions concern-
ing the "residency clock" for undocumented adults: Does the proper
determination for establishing domicile begin when they enter the
country? When they apply for a formal status? When they receive
formal, adjusted status?19 What happens if the state has no common
law on alien domicile? While Toll may have resolved the narrow issue
of domiciled G-4 aliens in states that grant tax exemptions, it is clear
its significance lies beyond this narrow setting. 91
Soon after Plyler and Toll were decided, their postsecondary ap-
plications were tested in the California case, Leticia "A" v. Board of
Regents of the University of California (Leticia "A" 1).192 Five un-
documented students who had been admitted into the University of
California (UC) for the 1984 fall term were notified by the University
that they were required to pay nonresident tuition and fees because
they were not entitled to California in-state resident status. 93 The
five plaintiffs had graduated from California high schools and had re-
sided continuously in California for an average of seven years each,
ranging from three years to eleven years. All were brought to the
United States as children by their parents.
94
In 1983, the California Legislature had revised its residency stat-
ute, including an amended reference to aliens: "[A]n alien, including
an unmarried minor alien, may establish his or her residence, unless
precluded by the Immigration and Nationality Act' 95 from establish-
190. Wong v. Board of Trustees, 125 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1st Dist. 1975) (omitted in official
reporter by order of California Supreme Court, 15 January 1976) (denying equal protection
challenge to requirement that aliens hold permanent resident status for one year prior to
determination of residence).
191. In Texas, as in many states, nonimmigrants such as K-visa holders (fiancees or
fiances) and L-holders (intracompany transferees) are more easily accorded residence for
tuition purposes, since federal immigration law does not require them to maintain a domi-
cile in their home country. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (a) (15) (K)-(L) (West 1995). Nonimmi-
grants on student visas set out in §(F), on the other hand, are required to maintain their
original domicile in their home country. 8 U.S.C.A. §1101(a)(15)(F)(West 1995). Thus, by
the terms of the F-visa application, they are not accorded permission to relinquish this
domicile.
192. Tentative Decision, No. 588982-5, (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cty., April 3, 1985);
Judgment (May 7, 1985); Statement of Decision (May 30, 1985) (Leticia "A" 1); Clarifica-
tion (May 19, 1992) (Leticia "A" I). All subsequent references are to the May 30, 1985
Statement of Decision, unless otherwise denoted.
193. Id. at 1-4. The California State University and College System, which had also
employed the University of California System practice, was also enjoined from continuing
in that practice. Id. at 9. The reinstated judgment, however, allocated the trial costs to the
UC system. Id. at 7.
194. Id. at 6.
195. Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-44, 66 Stat. 163 (codi-
fied and amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1525 (1995).
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ing domicile in the United States."'1 96 The UC read this statute as
precluding undocumented aliens from establishing California resi-
dence. The California statute defined a resident for purposes of in-
state tuition as "a student who has a residence, pursuant to Article 5
(commencing with Section 68060) of the Chapter in the state for more
than one year immediately preceding the residency determination
date."'1 97 A nonresident, under the California statute, is a person who
does not meet this code definition.
The statutes, though using the term "residence," actually exacted
the traditional criteria for establishing a "domicile." For example, a
resident could only maintain "one residence"'198 and "residency
[could] be changed only by the union of act and intent."'199 Section
68061 stated that "every person who is married or 18 years of age, or
older, and under no legal disability to do so, may establish resi-
dence."200 The UC argued that the undocumented students were
under a legal disability and thus, could not establish the requisite
intent.
The University's position was buttressed by a state Attorney
General's Opinion which stated that the University could deny resi-
dent status to the students because, in adopting Section 68062(h), the
California Legislature had only intended to make the statute conform
to Toll, and had not intended to grant residency to undocumented
aliens.201 The California Superior Court judge in Leticia "A," the
Honorable Ken W. Kawaichi, however, was not persuaded by the
University's argument or the Attorney General's Opinion. Instead,
he held the UC's policy of "precluding undocumented alien students
... from establishing California residency in the same manner and on
the same term as United States citizens" invalid under the California
Constitution.20 2 He quickly dismissed the State's "clean hands" argu-
ment,20 3 noting that the plaintiffs had been brought into California as
196. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 68062(h) (West 1995)(citations deleted). This section draws
upon Michael A. Olivas, Enduring Disability, supra note 16.
197. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68018 (West 1995).
198. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68062 (a) (West 1995).
199. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68062 (d) (West 1995).
200. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68061 (West 1995).
201. "The legislative history of Education Code section 68062, subdivision (h), demon-
strates that the Legislature did not intend to, and the subdivision does not, permit undocu-
mented aliens to establish residence for tuition purposes in California's public institutions
of higher education." 67 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 241, 241 (1984).
202. Leticia "A," No. 588982-4, slip. op. at 2 (May 7, 1985).
203. "It is neither applicable to the facts nor appropriate to the legal issues in this case."
Leticia "A" I, No. 588982-4, slip op. at 6 (April 3, 1985).
children.2 °4 The United States Supreme Court had similarly dismissed
this line of reasoning in Plyler,20 5 although not as clearly as did Judge
Kawaichi.
As the Court did in Plyler,0 6 Judge Kawaichi found education to
be more than a minimal interest requiring a mere rational relation-
ship.207 Noting the "importance of [public] higher education in Cali-
fornia, '20  he stated that applied heightened scrutiny as the
appropriate standard. 9 The judge, however, did not find it necessary
to apply the elevated standard, because he found that the policy did
not serve any rational government basis whatsoever.210 Unlike the
Attorney General's Opinion, which did not even attempt to mount a
constitutional justification for its result,21 ' Judge Kawaichi showed a
sophisticated grasp of immigration law relative to student residency
issues. He discerned that not all undocumented aliens are similarly
situated. For example, during the trial one of the plaintiffs was in the
process of becoming a permanent resident.21 2 In fact, several of the
undocumented students became eligible to apply for permanent resi-
dent status and were not subject to deportation.2 13
Judge Kawaichi pointed to the difficulty in employing federal im-
migration residency laws as criteria for determining students'
domiciles:
The policies underlying the immigration laws and regulations
are vastly different from those relating to residency for student
fee purposes. The two systems are totally unrelated for pur-
poses of administration, enforcement and legal analysis. The
use of unrelated policies, statutes, regulations or case law from
one system to govern portions of the other is irrational. The
204. Id.
205. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227 n.22.
206. "In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our soci-
ety." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
207. Leticia "A" I, No. 588982-4, slip op. at 4.
208. Id. at 8.
209. Id. (Emphasis deleted from original.)
210. Id. at 5.
211. 67 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 241 n. 11. In footnote 11, the Attorney General's Opinion
notes, "It is possible that this interpretation of the statute raises constitutional issues of
equal protection. (See Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.) We have not been asked and have not consid-
ered such questions." Id.
212. Leticia "A," No. 588982-4, slip op. at 9.
213. Id. Several of the original plaintiffs, including Leticia "A," had changed their sta-
tus during the course of the litigation. The original eight plaintiffs thereby shrank to four.
By 1993, all had adjusted their status by one or another means. Telephone interviews with
Multicultural Education, Training, and Advocacy (META) and Mexican American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) staff in San Francisco, CA (October 12, 1993).
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incorporation of policies governing adjustment of status of un-
documented aliens into regulations and administration of a sys-
tem for determining residence for student fee purposes is
neither logical nor rational.214
Under this reasoning, it would be a difficult legislative task for a state
to track federal immigration law for purposes of student residency re-
quirements, without violating principles of Equal Protection or
Preemption.215
Plyler, Toll, and Leticia "A" all seemed to erode states' ability to
employ federal immigration criteria irrebuttably to their postsecon-
dary residency determinations. However, in an unusual resuscitation
of the issue in California, an employee of the University of California
at Los Angeles (UCLA) refused to administer the residency policy,
claiming it was encouraging illegal immigration, and then filed a tax-
payer suit challenging the position in Bradford v. Board of Regents of
the University of California (Bradford I).216 Bradford asserted that
the California Attorney General's opinion overruled in Leticia "A"
was correct and that the Education Code residency provision struck
down by Leticia "A" should be considered valid.2 17 To do so would
restore the state provision that had provoked the Leticia "A" case and
would make it impossible for undocumented students to be consid-
ered California "residents" for tuition purposes.
By this time, state higher education officials had become converts
to Judge Kawaichi's ruling. The state and the universities had not ap-
pealed his 1985 ruling and had since decided that some of the alien
students deserved to be considered as residents, provided they met all
the other tests for in-state status.218 For one thing, several undocu-
mented students in state institutions did quite well in school and fur-
ther, allowing the undocumented to declare residency had not loosed
the floodgates: In a public postsecondary education system of several
hundred thousand students, UC and CSU officials estimated fewer
than 1000 students in the two systems were undocumented when ad-
214. Leticia "A" I, No. 588982-4, slip op. at 9-10 (Apr. 3, 1985).
215. Id. at 10.
216. No. C607748, (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Cty. May 30, 1990), affd sub nom, Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Ct. (Bradford II), 276 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990), rev. den., 1991 Cal. LEXIS 1367 (Cal. 1991). Bradford argued he had been forced to
resign for his action, but the court held that he had "voluntarily quit his position" over the
policy. Carol McGraw, UC Worker Who Quit Over Fees Policy Loses Bid to Get Job Back,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1990, at B3.
217. Id. (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68062(h) (West 1995)).
218. Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Leticia "A," No. 588982-2; interviews with CSU legal
staff (July 11, 1992) (discussing the CSU's long-standing policy of allowing undocumented
to establish domicile, dating back to 1985) (identities withheld upon request).
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mitted, fewer than one half of one percent of the total enrollment.219
One San Diego study, the city closest to the border, estimated that
only 80-90 of the 35,000 students in the San Diego campus of CSU,
and only one student at the new CSU-San Marcos campus, were un-
documented.220 Even the open door community college system esti-
mated that fewer than 1% of their 1.5 million students were
undocumented.2-1
Even so, on May 30, 1990, the Los Angeles County Superior
Court ruled against UCLA and in favor of Bradford.' The court
ruled that the original Education Code provisions (pre-Leticia "A")
were constitutional and that the state was required to charge the
aliens nonresident tuition, since they did not have the legal capacity to
establish domicile, as required by the Code.3
With this ruling, the public colleges attempted a new tactic, seek-
ing to dismiss the action or to have it transferred to Alameda County,
where Judge Kawaichi sat, in effect, to consolidate it with Leticia
"A."1224 Judge David Yaffe denied both the motion to dismiss and to
transfer the case, and scolded the University for its tactics:
You have this action pending in this court. You litigate it
through to a decision against you, and then, at that point, you
claim that the court should yield its jurisdiction because there's
another action that is still pending, in essence, up in Alameda
County .... It doesn't seem to me that there is any sound rule
of judicial policy that would permit a litigant to do that.'
219. Larry Gordon, Immigrants Face Cal State Fee Hike, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1992, at
A3, A20 (decision "could affect 800 of the 361,000 Cal State students"); Gary Libman,
Losing Out on a Dream?, L.A. TrNis, Jan. 23, 1992, at E3, Ell ("The [Bradford] decision
will affect only about 100 UC students but about 14,000 at state community colleges, offi-
cials estimate."). California public college students total over 2 million, including over 1.5
million in the community colleges. Fonseca & Andrews, supra note 28.
220. AUDITOR GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, A FIscAL IMPACr ANALYsIs OF UNDocu-
MENTED IMMIGRANTS RESIDING IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY 119-20 (1992) [hereinafter SAN
DIEGO STUDY]. The report did not estimate the undocumented students in the UC or
community colleges in San Diego County, because those students were being required to
pay out-of-state tuition. 1d. at 120.
221. Gordon, supra note 219, at A3 (estimating that only 14,000 of 1.5 million CCC
students were undocumented). MALDEF officials have insisted that even these numbers
overestimate the true enrollment, as most undocumented students cannot afford to pay
either in-state or out-of-state tuition and are hesitant to enroll in college, possibly subject-
ing themselves to detection by the INS.
222. No. C607748 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Cty. May 30, 1990) (David P. Yaffe, J.), cited in
Bradford HI, 276 Cal. Rptr. 197, 199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). All references to the Bradford I
opinion are as they are cited in Bradford I.
223. Id.
224. Bradford 11, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
225. Id
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At that point, the University was in for a penny, in for a pound.
They had brought in outside counsel to assist, and filed a writ of man-
date in an attempt to reverse Judge Yaffe's original ruling that found
for Bradford and his subsequent denial of the motions to dismiss and
transfer." 6 The appellate court upheld the trial judge's opinion, find-
ing that he had not abused his discretion in refusing to transfer and
consolidate Bradford with Leticia "A" in Alameda County.227 In ad-
dition, the appellate court held that the original section 68062(h)
properly excluded undocumented students from becoming in-state
residents for tuition purposes and that the statute was
constitutional.- 8
In the meantime, Judge Kawaichi was petitioned by the original
Leticia "A" plaintiffs to reconsider his decision and order, in light of
the competing Bradford Superior Court decision.229 He issued a mod-
ified holding, retaining jurisdiction and affirming his original decision
which struck down Sec. 68062(h).230 Despite Judge Kawaichi's rul-
ing,231 however, both parties found themselves mousetrapped: Be-
cause the original defendant had not appealed the judge's 1985
decision, neither party had an appellate decision on which to rely. By
this time, the institutions had come to see the issue as one where they
could accommodate the wishes of the original undocumented plain-
tiffs. However, with the ostensibly competing decisions, the state in-
stitutions did not wish to be whipsawed on this issue, especially when
they were being criticized for management practices and were bracing
for financial cutbacks. 32
The conflict between the two cases was finally addressed by a col-
lateral taxpayer case, American Association of Women (AAW) v. Cali-
226. Id. See also interviews with California State University legal staff, Long Beach,
CA (June, 1992).
227. Id. at 200.
228. Id. at 201-02.
229. Leticia "A" II, No. 588982-4 (May 19, 1992) (as clarified).
230. Id Judge Kawaichi ordered that the CSU be enjoined from denying in state resi-
dency benefits "to persons solely on the basis of their undocumented immigration status
... ." Id- He also reiterated his earlier ruling that the undocumented students "shall be
afforded a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate the bona fides [sic] of their residency."
Id.
231. I and others encouraged the then CSU chancellor Dr. W. Ann Reynolds not to
appeal the 1985 ruling, but to begin enrolling the students who were otherwise eligible to
attend. During the pendency of the Leticia "A" litigation, UC officials did not charge
nonresident tuition to the plaintiffs or others in their same status. Interview with Dr. W.
Ann Reynolds, CSU Chancellor, in Long Beach, CA (1985).
232. See, e.g., infra note 235.
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fornia State University.233 The Federation for American Immigration
Reform (FAIR), an immigration restrictionist group, brought the suit
to force the state's hand on this issue.2" In AAW, Judge Robert
O'Brien of the Los Angeles County Superior Court considered the
discrepancies between Leticia "A", as clarified, and Bradford, and de-
cided there were no conflicts.235 He held that Judge Kawaichi's "clari-
fication" constituted a substantive shift in the holding:
Unlike the original injunction the Leticia "A" clarification no
longer requires CSU automatically to treat undocumented stu-
dents the same as U.S. citizens. Thus, although the trial court
does not specifically follow the law established by Bradford, it
has tempered its original holding so that it in effect gives
credence to Bradford, as well as the process required by Section
68062(h).236
By creating a distinction without a difference, Judge O'Brien
found that the modified Leticia "A" decision was res judicata, com-
pletely tried and determined on its merits and that there was no "sub-
stantial identity of parties or those who are in privity with a party." 7
Judge O'Brien held that Bradford was "the only relevant California
appellate court decision, [and] controls this case on the legal issues
involved."' 38 Finally, he enjoined the CSU system "from violating
Education Code sections 68050 and 68062(h) or from treating undocu-
mented aliens as residents, for purposes of tuition, without first estab-
233. American Ass'n. of Women (AAW) v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. St. Univ., No.
BC061221, slip op. at 7 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Cty. Sept. 28, 1992), affd 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 15
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995). By this time, Dr. Barry Munitz was Chancellor of the CSU system. I
and others urged him not to appeal Judge Kawaichi's clarification. CSU also chose not to
appeal Leticia "A" I.
234. Id. at 1.
235. Ld. at 6-7. Essentially, Judge O'Brien held that because the CSU had not appealed
the original Leticia "A" ruling to an appellate court, the appellate Bradford decision
should trump the trial court. Id. at 7. At the time the Leticia "A" I and AAW cases were
occurring, the UC was in the papers on a regular basis for the exorbitant retirement pack-
age paid the retiring UC President, and for pending cuts in the UC proposed state budget.
For a small sampling of the negative press stories, see a series of articles by Louis Freed-
berg in the San Francisco Chronicle: UC Retirement Deal for Gardner Assailed, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 3, 1992, at Al; How UC Regents Tried to Downplay the Gardner Deal, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 16, 1992, at Al; Gardner Successor Gets Similar Pay Package, UC Compen-
sation Over $400,000 a Year, S.F. CHRON., July 30, 1992; Gardner Leaves UC With Plan to
Close Huge Budget Gap, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 19, 1992, at Al. See also, Debra Saunders, Fat
Left to Trim on Wilson's Plate, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2, 1992, at A14.
236. AAW, No. BC061221, slip op. at 9.
237. Id at 7, 8 ("Bradford has cast a different light on CSU's process and Section
68062(h) which should be decided at the appellate level... [and] Leticia 'A' is essentially a
finished case with different parties and a different threshold issue relating to Section
62062(h)" [sic].).
238. Id. at 9.
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lishing them as such in accordance with Education Code section
68062(h). 239
At this point, the UC considered itself bound by Bradford,2 40
while the CSU System appealed Leticia "A" I, as modified, in order to
have an appellate court resolution of the conflict.24 Thus, in Summer
1994, undocumented students were able to establish residency for
CSU purposes, but not for the UC or the 110 public CCC campuses.
Leticia "A" is quintessentially a residency dispute, since it turns
on factual findings of intent. Bradford and AAW hold that the un-
documented cannot establish the requisite intent,'42 while Leticia "A"
holds that they are not prevented from establishing residence.243
Judge Kawaichi's holding in Leticia "A" and its clarification, is clearly
the more correct of the two competing versions for two reasons: First,
Bradford and AAW misrepresented the elements of domicile and resi-
dence, and second, neither opinion carefully distinguished among the
different types of undocumented alienage, including those who are
able to establish domicile in the state.
For example, the Bradford appellate court inverts the Education
Code's statutory language by requiring undocumented aliens to prove
they are permitted to adjust their status.244 The court deftly reversed
the burden set out under the statute, which affirms aliens' rights to
establish residence unless they are specifically not allowed to do so. 245
To slip this knot, the Bradford court mocked the University's argu-
ment as "Daedalian but unpersuasive" and as "senseless."246 Further,
by equating the acts of "not precluding" with "authorizing," the court
ignored the precedent of Toll, where the U.S. Supreme Court had cer-
tified the question of whether Maryland state law enabled long term
nonimmigrant employees' children to establish domicile for post-
secondary tuition purposes.247 By requiring the state court to answer
239. I&
240. Telephone interview with UC legal office (January 10, 1993) (identities withheld
upon request).
241. IL at 9.
242. Bradford II, 276 Cal. Rptr at 200-01; AAW, No. BC061221, slip op. at 4-6.
243. Leticia "A" I, No. 588982-4, slip op. at 18 (May 19, 1992).
244. Bradford , 276 Cal. Rptr. at 201 ("We do not interpret the federal immigration
statutes, therefore, as authorizing, or not precluding, the establishment of domicile here by
those whose very presence is unlawful.") (emphasis added).
245. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68062(h) (West 1995). ("An alien, including an unmarried
minor alien, may establish his or residence, unless precluded by the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act from establishing domicile in the United States" (emphasis added; citations
omitted).
246. Bradford I, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 200-01.
247. Toll v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978).
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this technical question, it is clear that the Supreme Court envisions the
acquisition of postsecondary residency as a matter of state law, not
federal statute. If, as in California, the controlling state statute incor-
porates a federal classification ("unless precluded by the INA"), a
state court cannot invert the statute's presumption so as to defeat an
alien's ability to establish domicile under state law.24s
This error then enabled the Bradford court to misapply California
law concerning residency. In Cabral v. State Board of Control,249 a
California appellate court held that undocumented aliens are state
"residents" for purposes of establishing standing for state benefits.
The Bradford court held that Cabral was not controlling because it
"arose under a statute which contain[ed] no definition of the term
'resident."' 0 However, the court misapplied the Toll test for inter-
preting California Education Code 68062(h),2 1 by acting as if federal
law controlled for one purpose (i.e., finding that congressional lan-
guage was "unremarkable" but controlling)z2 while state law con-
trolled for another (i.e., the existence of a state residence statute
distinguished what would have otherwise been a controlling construc-
tion of state domicile),.
5 3
Moreover, even if federal law were controlling for determination
of domicile purposes, the Bradford and AAW courts misunderstood
the extent to which the INA enables and in some cases requires domi-
cile in the United States for long-term undocumented aliens who
eventually apply for the various forms of relief from deportation.
First, once aliens enter the United States, either surreptitiously or
through actions that render them out of legal status, they may be re-
moved only through an elaborate proceeding of deportation, where
the government has the burden of proof by "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation
are true. ' '11 4 The Supreme Court has further held that this standard
248. See Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 668-69 (1978) (G-4 holders can be U.S.
domiciliaries).
249. Cabral v. State Bd. of Control, 169 Cal. Rptr. 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (undocu-
mented can establish California residency for purposes of state Victims of Violent Crimes
Act standing).
250. Bradford I, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
251. See supra notes 149-191 and accompanying text.
252. Bradford 1, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
253. In the Toll case's earlier incarnation, Elkins v. Moreno, 397 A.2d 1009 (Md. 1979),
the Maryland court certified that under state law G-4 aliens were able to acquire and
demonstrate domicile. lId at 1019.
254. In Plyler, the Court held that the undocumented "might be granted federal permis-
sion to continue to reside in this country, or even to become a citizen... [and enjoy] an
inchoate federal permission to remain." 457 U.S. at 226. In addition, the Court struck
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"applies to all deportation cases, regardless of the length of time the
alien has resided in this country.""25 Additionally, several statutory
means of gaining legal status are available only to long-term undocu-
mented residents, as is an array of discretionary reliefs from deporta-
tion. For example, suspension of deportation, the relief provision at
issue in INS v. Chadha, ' 56 requires "a continuous period of not less
than seven years immediately preceding the date of such applica-
tion,"257 while registry provisions are available only to undocumented
persons who entered the U.S. before January 1, 1972 and have resided
in the United States "continuously since such entry."' 58 In both of
these situations, statutes and practice have evolved to ensure that the
aliens had established residence in the United States and had not
maintained domicile elsewhere or even physically left the country for
more than brief periods of time.259 Federal immigration law contem-
plates relief for long-term residents, but only for those who remain in
down the Texas statute that functionally resembled the California provision, noting, "A
State may not, however, accomplish what would otherwise be prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause, merely by defining a disfavored group as nonresident. And illegal entry
into the country would not, under traditional criteria, bar a person from obtaining domicile
within a State." Id. at 227 n.22.
255. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 n.19 (1966).
256. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (finding that legislative veto provisions violated separation of
powers).
257. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a)(1) (West 1995). In INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984),
the Court upheld the strict residence requirements, even though the holding meant that a
three month absence constituted ineligibility for suspension of deportation. This harsh re-
sult led to the Fifth Circuit denying suspension to an alien who had resided in the United
States for twelve consecutive years, minus one night. Sanchez-Dominguez v. INS, 780 F.2d
1203 (5th Cir. 1986). Congress in turn decided that the "continuous" standard was being
construed too literally, and amended section 1254 to enable aliens to have "brief, casual
and innocent" absences, as long as they "did not meaningfully interrupt the continuous
physical presence." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(b)(2) (West 1995). In short, it is clear that Congress
not only assumes that domicile can be acquired by deportable aliens, but requires that
domicile be established in the United States for these adjustments or reliefs from
deportation.
258. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1259 (West 1995). The 1972 cutoff date was established by IRCA.
Unlike the other "legalization" provisions, registry enables the alien to become a perma-
nent resident immediately without the intermediate "Temporary Resident Status." 8
U.S.C.A. § 1255a (West 1995).
259. Suspension of deportation and registry provisions are two excellent devices to reg-
ularize the status of an otherwise deportable alien, but they are by no means the only such
provisions. For several excellent textbook treatments of reliefs from deportation, see AL-
EXANDER ALEINIKOFF AND DAVID MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 597-688
(2d ed. 1991); STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 515-605 (1992); RICH-
ARD BOSWELL AND GILBERT CARRAscO, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW 517-89
(2d ed. 1991).
the country in uninterrupted fashion.260 Thus, Bradford and AAW
misconstrue federal law concerning undocumented domicile as well as
California state law determining residence.
In its most recent undocumented student case, Martinez v.
Bynum,261 the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Plyler, upholding a post-
Plyler Texas statute2 62 as applied, in which undocumented Mexican
parents could establish residence only if the children were not residing
in a Texas school district primarily for the purpose of attending
school.
263
In order for the undocumented students in Leticia "A" to be de-
nied residency under the Martinez rationale, they would have had to
enter surreptitiously in order to attend college or, in the alternative,
would have had to have nonimmigrant status as students and then
done something in violation of their visa requirements (e.g., holding
unauthorized employment while in student status).264 However, the
record makes it clear that the plaintiff students in Leticia "A" were
long-term residents that had graduated from California high schools, a
number of whom had become permanent residents during the course
of the trial.265 Furthermore, there is no indication that higher educa-
tion is a factor in attracting illegal entry to the country and every indi-
260. Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir. 1979) ("To establish domicile,
aliens must not only be physically present here, but must intend to remain"); Lok v. INS,
681 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding undocumented alien established domicile "when
he established an intent to remain") (citations omitted).
261. 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
262. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon's 1995).
263. Martinez, 461 U.S. 321 (holding that Texas could charge tuition to alien children if
families were not domiciled in the State). See also Matter of Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 218
(BIA 1980) (eligibility for suspension of deportation requires establishment of domicile in
U.S.).
264. The various forms of relief do not distinguish among the various forms of becom-
ing undocumented. For example, under INA § 212 (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), relief would be
available to undocumented aliens whether they entered illegally under their own power,
were brought here illegally by their parents, or entered as a nonimmigrant and then did
something to violate the terms of their visa (e.g., switching schools without permission or
not maintaining full time student status). While this argument exceeds the scope of this
article, it seems clear that the greatest moral and legal claims to equitable relief can be
made by aliens whose parents surreptitiously brought them into the country. The children
in this example have the domicile of their parents (or custodial parent, if only one), and
once they reach majority age, can establish their own independent domicile through oper-
ation of law. Thus, if there is a "clean hands" argument to be made either in court or a
legislature, these children are innocent of any illegal entry. Plyler mooted this point, in any
event. 457 U.S. at 228-30 (striking down state's rationales for regulating immigration).
265. Leticia "A" II, No. 588982-4, slip op. at 4-5.
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cation that the aliens intended to reside in the United States.266 This
intention, combined with actual presence, constitutes residence or
domicile in California.
That federal law does not preclude the undocumented from es-
tablishing domicile is clear from careful readings of Plyer and Marti-
nez, as well as the INA provisions.267 Even Toll appears to rule out
such arbitrary residency requirements with regard to nonimmigrants:
"we cannot conclude that Congress ever contemplated that a State, in
the operation of a university, might impose discriminating tuition
charges and fees solely on account of the federal immigration
classification.""2
As a final piece to this puzzle, the treatment of legalization bene-
fits also suggests that federal law does not preclude aliens from estab-
lishing domicile under state laws that incorporate the INA. The
Bradford appellate court attempted to trump the Leticia "A" analysis
by arguing that even the generous amnesty to legalize the undocu-
mented status of some aliens under IRCA did not contemplate gener-
osity toward the undocumented:
Federal law, too, discriminates against undocumented aliens in
the most basic way: it forbids their entry into the country and
authorizes their arrest and deportation. Even undocumented
aliens given preferred status under federal law - those author-
ized under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 to
become lawful temporary residents and thereafter permanent
residents - are disqualified for five years from most federal
programs of financial assistance to the needy. If federal finan-
cial assistance may be withheld from newly legalized aliens who,
under the 1986 amnesty law, 'are to be welcomed as full and
productive members of our nation,' surely the state is not consti-
tutionally required to subsidize the university education of other
aliens who have never legalized their status.269
But the Bradford Court, in its pell-mell rush to close every door, got it
wrong: IRCA does allow legalizing students to receive its benefits.
The only public benefits legalizing aliens were entitled to during their
probationary status were those considered most essential, and these
specifically included access to the various college student financial aid
provisions of the Higher Education Act of 1965. Moreover, the INS
266. Testimony of Dr. Leo Chavez, anthropology professor at UC Irvine, in Leticia "A"
I, No. 588982-4, Transcript at 26-34; and Leticia "A" II, No. 588982-4, slip op. at 2-4 (chil-
dren are brought to U.S. without any plans for them to enroll in college).
267. See supra notes 257-259.
268. Toll, 458 U.S. at 17.
269. Bradford II, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 201 (citations omitted).
promulgated 1994 guidelines, noting that no federal legislation had
ever been enacted "that would permit states or state-owned [sic] insti-
tutions to refuse admission to undocumented aliens or to disclose
their records" to the INS.270 Thus, financial aid eligibility was avail-
able to these "welcomed" aliens. In their attempt to show otherwise,
the appellate court misread the very benefits statute they were using
to buttress their argument that federal law did not reference undocu-
mented aliens.27 In this light, it is not "senseless" but sensible and
possible to interpret the California Education Code provision literally,
and to find that undocumented aliens are not precluded from estab-
lishing residence.
IV. The Social Science of Alienage
This Part reviews the social science literature on residency deter-
minations, research on alien students, and alien benefit studies. These
areas pose significant research problems, as studying undocumented
students presents unusual ethical and social science limitations.272
270. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(h) (West 1995). See generally NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAw
CENTER, GUIDE TO ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS 53 (1992); see also Calvo, supra
note 134. The U.S. Department of Education has attempted to construe Title IV financial
aid eligibility narrowly and has denied eligibility to aliens undergoing legalization in the
Family Fairness Program/Family Unity Program (FUP), the scheme by which mixed un-
documented, permanent resident/citizen families could stay together in the United States.
Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). Following a successful federal court challenge
to this interpretation, the Department notified colleges that aliens being legalized under
FUP who were beneficiaries of an INS approved "Immigrant Petition for Spouse or Rela-
tive" would be eligible to apply for Title IV funds. Gonzalez v. Wanda Gaines, No. 9-
92CV12 (E.D. Tex. June 9, 1993); see also Dear Colleague Letter, Div. of Pol'y Dev., U.S.
Dep't of Educ. (March 4, 1993) (on file with author).
271. INS Issues Guidelines on School Approval Petitions, INTER. REL. 347-48, 361-67
(March 14, 1994) (Revised INS School Approval Guidelines).
272. This growing body of work subdivides into two major areas, which I label for
shorthand use, "how many are there/technical" and "how many are there/conceptual."
The former includes issues of measurement error, population data, sampling techniques,
and the like. For examples of this genre, see Vernon Briggs, Methods of Analysis of Illegal
Immigration into the United States, 18 INT'L MIGR. REV. 623 (1984); Frank Bean, Hanley L.
Brown, and W. Parker Frisbie, The Sociodemographic Characteristics of Mexican Immi-
grant Status Groups: Implications for Studying Undocumented Mexicans, 18 INT'L MIGR.
REV. 672 (1984). While the two areas overlap, the latter body of research concentrates
more upon the underlying legal definitions and conceptual issues, such as how statutes and
regulations define these properties. Classic examples include Kristin Couper and Ulysses
Santamaria, An Elusive Concept: The Changing Definition of Illegal Immigrant in the
Practice of Immigration Control in the United Kingdom, 18 INT'L MIGR. REV. 437 (1984);
MANUEL GARCIA Y GRIEGO, EL VOLUMEN DE LA MIGRACION DE MEXICANOS No Docu-
MENTADOS A Los ESTADOS UNInos: NuEvAs HYPOTESis (1979); Alejandro Portes, To-
ward a Structural Analysis of Illegal (Undocumented) Immigration, 12 INT'L MIGR. REV.
469 (1978).
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Even the most obvious questions - such as how many undocumented
aliens there are in the United States - are mixed social science and
political questions. 273 There has been a long-standing history of over-
estimating the number of aliens for political purposes and "law en-
forcement" expediencies, and these questionable research findings
often gain receptive public audiences and even traffic as authoritative
"evidence" for judges in immigration cases.2 74 Therefore, great scru-
tiny must be accorded any social science research that is used to but-
tress an immigration case or to establish the effect of undocumented
immigration upon U.S. labor markets, public benefits, or social serv-
ices. Not only are there technical difficulties in measurement, docu-
mentation, and survey research, but there are serious theoretical and
cultural deficiencies in capturing both the migrants' views and the re-
ceiving community's attitudes about the sojourners in their midst.275
For example, as the demographer Murray Chapman has noted,
One clear implication of all these [immigration] terms and dis-
tinctions is that the concept of internal migration only faintly
captures the full meaning of territorial mobility .... The data
from national censuses and regional surveys, the primary
sources for migration analysis, fail to capture this circularity be-
273. Daniel B. Levine, Kenneth Hill, and Robert Waner, IMMiGRATION STATISTICS: A
STORY OF NEGLECr (1985).
274. See, e.g. Estevan Flores, The Impact of Undocumented Migration on the U.S. Labor
Market, 5 Hous. J. OF INT'L L. 287, 294-302 (reviewing uncritical acceptance by courts of
flawed immigration studies). Flores reviews the flawed work of economist Donald Huddle,
particularly his methodology in determining who was undocumented. His research stands
in contrast to Julian Simon's, infra note 355, and appears to overestimate services and
costs. DONALD HUDDLE, THE COSTS OF IMMIGRATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1993)
[hereinafter HUDDLE, CosTs]. For example, he does not provide data for his contention
that immigrants (what he calls "legal immigrants") cost $2.11 billion in public higher edu-
cation for 1992 alone. Ia at 9. He also assumes that bilingual education and "language
deficiency instruction" costs (estimated to be $1.07 billion in 1992) are attributable solely
to the undocumented population. Id. at 10. For higher education participation rates, he
averaged the San Diego County Study, see supra note 220, and L.A. County Study, see
supra note 334, and assumed from the only metropolitan border county in the country (as
Los Angeles County did not measure higher education) that the undocumented consti-
tuted 0.97% of the postsecondary population. He then extrapolated to the entire U.S.
postsecondary population. HUDDLE, CoSTs, supra, at 4-5 Exhibit 5. He also estimates
that of "Legal Immigrants," refugees, and asylees entering in 1992, a quarter (25.45%) of
the college-aged attended postsecondary institutions and 7.3% received federal Pell
Grants. Id. at 11-12. These figures, premised upon his re-calculation of San Diego's data,
are without support and are likely, inordinately high.
275. See, eg., Portes, supra note 272 (reviewing problems of terminology and theory in
immigration policy research).
cause they yield only cross-sectional snapshots of forms of be-
havior that are exceedingly sensitive to time .... 276
And attitudes of the receiving community towards immigrants can
fluctuate, either welcoming and integrating them into the community
and polity, or blaming them for other unrelated economic ills. In a
perceptive review of U.S. nativism in the U.S.-Mexico context, de-
mographer Wayne A. Cornelius has written,
[if] surges of anti-Mexican nativism are viewed as a cyclical phe-
nomenon - something that seems to happen at least once in a
generation - it could be argued that the U.S. is now overdue
for another such nativist spasm. The point is that the attitudes,
perceptions, fears and prejudices that underlie such movements
do not go away once the immediate stimulus of an economic
recession or international reverse of some kind passes. They re-
main latent in the body politic, waiting to be tapped and
manipulated by politicians and special interest groups that have
no reservations about appealing to the baser instincts of their
constituents. Indeed, we may be entering a period in which such
appeals to nativism are increasingly respectable, because they
can be cloaked in an aura of protecting our basic values as a
society, the hard won livin4 standards of the middle class, or
even the national security.2
Cornelius, writing a decade ago, may have been anticipating the
recent events which demonstrated the political expedience of demon-
izing undocumented aliens: the cynical manipulation of the war on
drugs to justify the detention of unaccompanied refugee minors in
dreadful, Dickensian conditions in INS detention facilities in Texas
and California;278 appeals to national security in the interdiction at sea
of Haitian boat people desperately fleeing poverty and political op-
pression in their country;2 79 and legislative proposals to make asylum
claims more difficult to advance and easier to deny, enacted following
276. Murray Chapman, On the Cross-Cultural Study of Circulation, 12 INT'L MIGR.
REv. 559, 560 (1978).
277. Wayne A. Cornelius, America in the Era of Limits: Migrants, or Nativists, and the
Future of U.S.-Mexican Relations, in MEXICAN-U.S. RELATIONS, CoNFLICr, AND CONSE-
QUENCE 1373-74 (Vasquez and Garcia y Griego eds., 1983).
278. Michael A. Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children in the United States: Deten-
tion, Due Process, and Disgrace, 2 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 159 (1990) (examining shameful
conditions of confinement for refugee children in INS custody); but see Reno v. Flores, 113
S. Ct. 1439 (1993) (allowing INS to continue custodial practices).
279. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (holding that 11th Circuit should not have
decided constitutional question of racial/national origin discrimination in treatment of Hai-
tians). For an account of the Clinton Administration's disappointing handling of this mat-
ter, see Larry Rohter, The Supreme Court" Rights Groups Fault Decision, As Do Haitians,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1993, at A18.
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the first domestic terrorist attack on U.S. soil, alleged to have been
perpetrated by Islamic aliens.2s0
Against this background, the manipulation of social science data
for advancing anti-immigrant arguments has reached fever pitch in the
case made against the undocumented in the United States. This dis-
course, as I will note in the last section of Part IV, has dire conse-
quences for the issue of undocumented college students.
The area of college residency determinations is in need of fresh
insights, as no ethnographic study and few administrative law studies
have emerged to shed light on the important role administrators play
in interpreting residency rules and making residency determinations.
The gap is considerable because significant redefinition and reinter-
pretation can occur between the enactment of statutes or promulga-
tion of regulations, and the institutional determination of a student's
residency status. As one knowledgeable scholar of residency practices
noted, "most classification officers would be likely to stress that the
difficulties of making either/or decisions in individual cases should not
be underestimated."'
One scholar who has begun to examine the administrative law of
residency determinations is Richard Padilla, who has written a doc-
toral dissertation and undertaken two studies on the discretionary as-
pects of residency.2s In his 1989 study, Padilla asked registrars and
residency officials in a state where all institutions were required to
employ the same criteria and procedures to review twelve "cases" of
student transcripts, applications, and residency information.2 Even
using a very carefully controlled interview protocol, he could not get
280. Mary Tabor, Specter of Terror: U.S. Indicts Egyptian Cleric as Head of Group
Plotting "War of Urban Terrorism," N.Y. TiMas, August 26, 1993, at Al (immigration is-
sues in 1993 World Trade Center bombing). Another myth involves the criminal proclivi-
ties of aliens. In 1992, for example, the alien prison population in California was 10.4%,
less than the state's 15% alien population and many of the aliens were in prison on immi-
gration-related changes. John Miller, Immigrant-Bashing's Latest Falsehood, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 8, 1994, at A14.
281. CARBONE, BORDERS, supra note 40, at 8.
282. Richard Padilla, Residency Classification in Texas Colleges: The Application of
Complex Legislation to the Complex Circumstances of Students (1988) (unpublished Ph.D
dissertation, University of Houston) (on file with author); Richard Padilla, Postsecondary
Residency Classification: The Application of Complex Legislation to the Complex Cir-
cumstances of Students, University of Houston, Institute for Higher Education Law and
Governance, Monograph 89-6 (1989) [hereinafter Padilla, 1989 Study]; Richard Padilla,
Immigration Status and Residency Determination for Tuition Purposes, University of
Houston, Institute for Higher Education Law and Governance, Monograph 91-4 (1991)
[hereinafter Padilla, 1991 Study].
283. Padilla, 1989 Study, supra note 282. The application packages resembled those
traditionally reviewed by the officials.
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all the administrators to agree on any of the cases, except one in which
all would have denied residency status.8 In five of the twelve cases,
no majority could conclusively agree on whether to deny or grant
residency.2
85
Most tellingly, the administrators split 5-4 on the case of a student
who had been granted political asylum in the United States. In the
case facts, the student had been in the state for six months as an appli-
cant for asylum, and an additional eight months after he had received
formal asylum status.8 6 Under the state's law, he was clearly entitled
to be treated as a resident student.
2s 7
In two other hypotheticals, facts were given for undocumented
students. In one hypothetical, the student was brought surreptitiously
into the country as a child.2s s In the other, the individual had had
student status on an F-i visa but had left school several years before in
violation of the terms of his visa, and a second student had lived and
worked in the state for six years since leaving school and owned a
home in the state.2 9 When polled on these hypothetical cases, two
officials voted nonresident for the former, and seven would have re-
quested more information, while for the latter, seven voted nonresi-
dent and two would have sought additional information.2 9 In neither
case did any official agree to grant residency status to the undocu-
mented students, even though the state law concerning undocumented
college students is vague enough to permit the granting of residency.
Virtually all the registrars considered the undocumented students to
be "foreign students," even though in the first case, the facts would
likely not permit the applicant to obtain "residency" in his former
"home" country.291 These students may have been nonresidents, but
they were certainly not foreign students.
These cases point to another complexity, that of the variegations
of "foreign students," ranging from the more traditional F-visa holder
to other immigrant and nonimmigrant visa categories. In Texas, the
state where Padilla conducted his studies, the state specifies the possi-
bility of obtaining residency for foreign students who hold visas with
284. Iat at 11 Table 2.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. TEx. EDUC. CODE § 54.057(a) (West Supp. 1995), as applied by the Texas Higher
Education Coordinating Board, RULES AND REGULATION: RESIDENCE STATUS (1991).
288. Padilla, 1989 Study, supra note 282, at 11 Table 2, 18.
289. Id at 18.
290. Id.
291. Id at 11 Table 2.
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A-1 or A-2 (diplomatic), 29 G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 (treaty organiza-
tion),2 93 K (finances or fiancees), 294 and OP-1 (qualified immigrants
from underrepresented countries) classifications, 295 as well as those
who have been classified as refugees,296 asylees,297 parolees,
298 condi-
tional permanent residents,299 or temporary residents (i.e., undergoing
amnesty under IRCA). 0 ° In addition, there is a special provision for
aliens who are part of NATO forces301 and a reciprocity agreement for
Mexican nationals who reside in Mexican border states to attend
Texas colleges in border counties and to pay in-state tuition.0 2 More-
over, these provisions are not unique to Texas: a 1986 study of resi-
dency exemptions found more than seventy different alienage
provisions in the fifty states and the District of Columbia.30 3 As an
additional twist, public institutions in fifteen states each devise their
own residency criteria, including alienage requirements.
Moreover, it is not always clear who is undocumented and who
may be eligible for a more permanent category or adjustment of sta-
tus. Leticia "A" and her colleagues eventually adjusted to become
permanent residents.3 0 4 The INA is full of safe havens, exceptions,
loopholes, and interstices that may render yesterday's undocumented
alien today's permanent resident or citizen. These categories and op-
portunities exist quite apart from any legislative or executive amnesty
provisions.3 0 5 For example, Chinese students in the United States re-
292. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A) (1995).
293. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(G) (1995).
294. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K) (1995).
295. 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1995).
296. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1995).
297. 8 u.s.c. § 101, 1158 (1995).
298. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1995).
299. 8 U.s.c. § 1255(a)-(h) (1995).
300. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K) (1995).
301. TEX. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 54.057(b) (West Supp. 1995).
302. TEx. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 54.060 (West Supp. 1995).
303. Olivas, Postsecondary Requirements, supra note 58.
304. Leticia "A" II, No. 588982-4, slip op. at 4-5.
305. For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union has prompted several statutory
schemes for accommodating Soviet scientists and other highly desirable aliens. See
Lautenberg Amendment, Pub. L. No. 102-511, 106 Stat. 3349 (1992) and the Common-
wealth and Baltic Scientists Immigration and Exchange Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-509,
106 Stat. 3317 (1992). I do recognize that there is disagreement on the extent to which the
undocumented can establish domicile. See, e.g., Nadine Wettstein, Lawful Domicile For
Purposes of INA § 212 (c): Can It Begin with Temporary Residence?, INEmR. REL., Sept.
26, 1994, at 1273. However, she and others she cites do not address Plyler's footnote 22,
which appears to allow domicile. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227 n. 22.
ceived a gift in the form of the Chinese Student Protection Act.30 6 To
paraphrase Tolstoy, not all the undocumented are alike, and each may
be unique in a different way. The length of time in the United States
is an important criterion of eligibility for a number of these reclassifi-
cations, and, according to the Plyler Court, many undocumented
aliens may have "inchoate permission" to remain in this country, vir-
tually forever. 0 7
In order to measure the change in residency practices triggered
by the IRCA amnesty legislation and other immigration statutes and
regulations, Padilla readministered his case study portfolios in 1991 to
registrars at the same nine Texas public colleges he had surveyed ear-
lier.308 His respondents included five of the same subjects and three
new ones.30 9 One was unable to participate.310 Padilla's findings fur-
ther revealed the confusion and imprecision inherent in making dis-
cretionary judgments on complex evidence and unclear categories.
Four of the five original respondents reversed course concerning
the asylum-seeker applicant in the follow-up study, but there was still
no consensus on whether or not he would be eligible for resident sta-
tus.311 This was all the more surprising because, as Padilla notes, the
Texas Attorney General's office had since issued an opinion indicating
that a student with these facts clearly was eligible for residency reclas-
sification.312 In the two hypothetical cases involving undocumented
students, one brought to the country as a child by his parents and
another who violated the terms of his original student status, the re-
spondents again overwhelmingly indicated they would not reclassify
them as residents.1 3 Indeed, in extramural remarks, two respondents
emphatically indicated that they would report the latter student to the
INS, despite no obligation to do so, and that they would not admit him
even as a nonresident, international student.31 4
306. Pub. L. No. 102-404, 106 Stat. 1971 (1992). For an analysis of the events leading up
to the statute, see Jean LaRocque, The Pro-Democracy Movement in the People's Republic
of China and Its Immigration Implications for Chinese Students in the United States, 9 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 257 (1991).
307. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226 ("It would of course be most difficult for the State to justify
a denial of education to a child enjoying an inchoate federal permission to remain.").
308. Padilla, 1991 Study, supra note 282, at 6-7.
309. Id. at 8.
310. I.
311. Id. at 8-9.
312. Id. at 18-19 (citing 1985 Tex. AG LEXIS 56).
313. Padilla, 1991 Study, supra note 282, at 14-16.
314. Id at 15.
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Padilla again found substantial disagreement among the respon-
dents on the issue of when resident "clocks" began to toll. He
concluded:
[T]here can be little doubt that immigration status has a direct
impact on the practice of residency determination for tuition
purposes. The complex circumstances of students are made even
harder to understand and interpret when viewed through the
two hazy windows of immigration and the residency laws, rules,
and regulations. Consequently, similarly situated students re-
ceive inconsistent residency classifications.
3 15
These are important findings, which reveal the inconsistencies in
administering postsecondary residency, make the attempt to restrict
the flow of undocumented college students as "ludicrously ineffec-
tual"' 16 as the Texas efforts had been in controlling undocumented
alien children's immigration in Plyler. AAW's reasoning also ffies in
the face of this practicality test: it, like Bradford, ignores the adminis-
trative aspects of establishing domicile.
31 7
In a more recent study, a Houston demographer, Nestor P. Rod-
riguez, confirmed the earlier findings by Padilla.31 8 Of the twelve
Houston-area colleges surveyed, admissions officials from only one in-
stitution acknowledged a practice of admitting undocumented stu-
dents, and then only if they paid international student fees.319
315. Id. at 17.
316. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 ("'[c]harging tuition to undocumented children constitutes a
ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immigration."' (quoting Plyler v.
Doe, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 (1978)).
317. For example, Judge O'Brien misreads Leticia "A" II as not being in conflict with
Bradford HI, because Judge Kawaichi modified his Leticia "A" I holding. Judge O'Brien
stated: "Unlike the original injunction, the Leticia "A" clarification no longer requires
CSU automatically to treat undocumented students the same as U.S. citizens. Thus,
although the trial court does not specifically follow the law established by Bradford, it has
tempered its original holding so that it in effect gives credence to Bradford, as well as the
process required by Section 68062(h)." AAW, No. BC061221, slip op. at 6 (citations omit-
ted). This is completely wrong, both because the "automatic" language is a false issue, and
because Leticia "A" II cannot be read as "giv[ing] credence" to Bradford I or Bradford HI.
Bradford 1I holds that the undocumented cannot become residents, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 201,
while both Leticia "A" opinions hold that they can become residents. Leticia "A" I, No.
588982-4, slip op. at 10 (Apr. 3,1985); Leticia "A" II, No. 588982-4, slip op. at 18. This is an
extraordinary misreading of Judge Kawaichi's clear language in both opinions.
318. Nestor P. Rodriguez, Undocumented Immigrant Students and Higher Education:
A Houston Study, University of Houston, Institute for Higher Education Law and Govern-
ance, Monograph 90-10 4 (1990).
319. See Rodriguez, supra note 318, at 47. This finding may be due to fear of disclosure,
as I have personal knowledge of undocumented students attending at least five Houston
colleges, public and private. See also Nestor P. Rodriguez, Economic Restructuring and
Latino Growth in Houston, in IN THE BARRIos, LATiNos AND THE UNDERCLASS DEBATE
101, (Joan Moore & Raquel Pinderhughes eds., 1993) (noting the role of Latinos in Hous-
1070
Rodriguez found the same inconsistencies as had Padilla, and even
probed within institution discrepancies:
Interestingly, in two universities where upper- and mid-level ad-
ministrators had indicated earlier that they would be receptive
to undocumented students, lower-level staff contacted by the
study responded they would exclude undocumented students.
The lower-level staff were ignorant of upper-level decisions. In
one of the two cases, an admissions office worker indicated that
his response to applicants seeking admission varied by the char-
acteristics of the applicants. The office worker simply directed
applicants who 'look immigrant' or spoke with a marked accent
to the admissions office for international students. Hispanics
and Asians were usually the applicants sent by the office worker
to the international student admissions office. 2°
The practice employed by this worker resembles discriminatory hiring
practices, such as those prohibited by the IRCA.3 21 Nor does this
worker's action appear to be an isolated occurrence. In a 1990 Gov-
ernment Accounting Office study, nearly 20% of the employers sur-
veyed conceded they had discriminated against job applicants or
employees either by engaging in illegal national origin discriminatory
practices or by deliberately not hiring "foreign-appearing" or "for-
eign-sounding" job applicants - even if the applicants had employ-
ment authorization documents or were otherwise eligible to work in
the United States.322
The Rodriguez study also uncovered enrollment inconsistencies,
depending upon the funding sources of the programs. Area colleges,
particularly community colleges, enrolled students without regard to
their citizenship status in federally and state-funded citizenship, Eng-
lish, and General Equivalent Diploma (GED) courses, but required
immigration eligibility for enrolling in English as a Second Language
(ESL), adult basic education, and GED coursework supported by
other federal funds.323 When the IRCA funds for citizenship classes
began to flow, the Houston Community College received so many
funds that a scandal arose over its enrollment tactics and lavish curric-
ton growth during the 1980s); ARNOLDO DE LEON, ETHNCrry IN THE SUNBELT, MEXICAN
AMERICANS IN HOusTON 1989 (historical review of Latinos in Houston); JOE FEAGIN,
FREE ENTERPRISE CITY: HOUSTON IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1988)
(same).
320. See Rodriguez, supra note 318, at 47-48.
321. 8 U.S.C. §1324(a) (1995).
322. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EM-
PLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 38-39 (1990).
323. Rodriguez, supra note 318, at 40-43. In both 1989 and 1990, HCC enrolled be-
tween 23,000 and 25,000 students in federally-funded amnesty programs. By 1991, that
number had declined to 10,000. Reject HCCS Bonds, Hou. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1993, at B10.
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ulum purchases." Despite the abundance of funding, once the aliens
who had completed these citizenship classes prior to having gained
permanent residence were not allowed to attend regular academic
credit or technical courses in the same institution.3z
Martinez v. Bynum,326 the follow-up case to Plyler v. Doe, made
it clear that aliens whose families did move solely for taking advantage
of education benefits without residing in the district could be legiti-
mately denied those benefits. 327 However, not one of the students in
the Rodriguez study, even those with some college experience outside
the United States, entered the United States in the hope of attending
college. All had either come to avoid war in their country, to make a
better life with their families, or for another related reason.
328
A casual reader of newspapers and other materials might think
that aliens were overrunning the whole United States, and California
in particular. 32 9 This climate of hysteria has been fueled by Califor-
nia's economic recession, false impressions created by inaccurate stud-
ies, and shameless attempts to scapegoat undocumented aliens as a
greedy and dangerous population.330  While closer examination
reveals these claims to be incorrect or exaggerated, the discourse of
this campaign has largely succeeded in halting any genuine reform ef-
forts or counterstories to place the issue in a more balanced light.
324. Karen Roebuck, HCC Investigating Amnesty Ed Program, Unexpected Layoffs,
High-Priced Tapes Subjects of Probe, Hou. POST, Sept. 9, 1990, at A28 (former superinten-
dent and state legislator overpricing materials for legalization classes).
325. In most cities, English as a Second Language courses and naturalization classes are
filled to overflowing. See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, English is Precious: Classes are Few, N.Y.
TimEs, August 29, 1993, at 6Y (with estimated New York City need to serve 1.36 million
limited English proficiency residents, classes available for only 30,000).
326. 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
327. Id. at 333.
328. See Rodriguez, supra note 318, at 24-26.
329. An entire clipping service would be necessary to report all the media attention
paid this topic. For a small sample, see James Clad, Slowing The Wave, 95 FOR. POL. 151
(Summer, 1994); Jerry Gillam & John Schwada, Wilson Defiant Over Immigration Issue,
L.A. TiMs, Aug. 19, 1993, at A3 (article suggesting Gov. Wilson is gaining political favor
by anti-immigrant remarks); Dan Morain & Mark Gladstone, Racist Verse Stirs Up Anger
in Assembly, L.A. TiMEs, May 19, 1993, at A3 (state legislator circulates anti-immigrant
poem in Sacramento); Andrew Murr, A Nasty Turn on Immigrants: Wilson Declares the
State 'Under Siege,' NEWSwEEK, Aug. 23, 1993, at 28 (article suggesting Gov. Wilson is
immigrant-bashing due to poor political standing in polls); Robert Novak, The Latest Enti-
tlement, WASH. PosT, May 24, 1993, at A19 (claiming Mexican women enter U.S. to have
their babies in Los Angeles County); Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Shifts Tack on Illegal
Immigration, L.A. Tirvs, Aug. 25, 1993, at A3 (analysis of Gov. Wilson's efforts to strike
down sanctuary ordinances).
330. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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California Governor Pete Wilson is the chief cheerleader for anti-
immigrant sentiment.33' In a variety of settings he has preached his
message of how California's troubles have been caused by undocu-
mented aliens in the areas of public services, jobs and employment,
prisons and the criminal justice system, health care and hospitals, and
education in public schools and colleges, specifically targeting undocu-
mented alien college students.332 His inflammatory remarks have
been widely reported in the media.
333
To document his charges, Governor Wilson has drawn from sev-
eral studies, particularly one conducted to measure the relative costs
and benefits of immigration for Los Angeles County, California.
3 3 4
This ambitious 1992 project, the Impact of Undocumented Persons and
Other Immigrants on Costs, Revenues, and Services in Los Angeles
County, is one of the more comprehensive governmental analyses of
immigration economic costs and benefits. The study concluded that
immigrant groups - which constitute 25% of the Los Angeles County
population - consumed $947 million worth of county services, which
was 30.9% of the total net Los Angeles County costs for the 1991-92
year.335 The study also estimated that immigrants contributed only
$139 million to the County.336 While these figures seem lopsided
against the County, this group of immigrants also generated 9 times
more California State revenue and 18 times more federal revenue
than they did Los Angeles County revenue, totalling $4.3 billion. 337
These data show a net contribution by immigrant groups to tax reve-
nues but an inefficient reimbursement/outlay distribution of costs to
the County from other tax entities.338 However, the discrepancy be-
tween County revenue and outlay was seized upon by Gov. Wilson
331. See supra note 329.
332. i& In addition, Gov. Wilson vetoed a bill passed by the legislature on May 24,
1991 that would have clarified the Bradford/Leticia "A" confusion by allowing undocu-
mented students to establish residency. See veto message accompanying A.B. 592 (June 21,
1991) (on file with author). He also has allies in Congress. See eg., House Considers More
Immigration in Emotional Debate, INTER. REL., Mar. 14, 1994, at 345 (Remarks of Rep.
Rohrabacher).
333. See supra note 329.
334. Los ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, THE IMPACT OF UNDOCU-
MENTED PERSONS AND OTHER IMMIGRANTS ON COSTS, REVENUES, AND SERVICES IN Los
ANGELES COUNTY (1992) [hereinafter IMPACT].
335. See IMPACT, supra note 334, at 4.
336. Id. at 4, 7.
337. Id. at 8. A federal study also concluded that immigrant education programs are
underfunded. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFF., IMMIGRANT EDUCATION: FEDERAL FUND-
ING HAS NOT KEPT PACE wrrH STUDENT INCREASES (1994).
338. See IMPACT, supra note 334, at 6.
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and others to fan a campaign of inaccurate anti-alien sentiment gener-
ally, to veto legislation aimed at solving the college residency prob-
lem, 339 and to introduce restrictionist legislation designed to make
aliens ineligible for other public benefits.
340
The study, even though it documented a substantial net contribu-
tion paid by the immigrant groups, was confusing because it lumped
together permanent residents since 1980 with aliens who legalized
their status since the 1986 IRCA amnesty, citizen children of undocu-
mented parents, and the undocumented.34' Of course, these groups
bear little relationship to each other except in a vague, undifferenti-
ated sense of dispossessed immigration shorthand. Lumping together
these distinct categories distorted the study's findings in several ways.
Permanent residents since 1980 are persons who either came to the
United States by family relationships or employment preferences, who
adjusted status from non-immigrant visas to become permanent resi-
dents, or who employed one of a number of other legal means to re-
main permanently in the United States.342  After five years,
339. See supra note 332. See also Renee Koury, School Denial Bills Stir Debate: A
Movement to Ban Illegal Immigrant Children From Public Schools is Increasingly Being
Discussed, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 10, 1993, at B1.
340. Gillam & Schwada, supra note 329, at A3; Dan Morain, Bill to Bar Illegal Immi-
grants From Schools is Defeated, L.A. TiwEs, Apr. 1, 1993, at A21; Gov. Wilson, About
Tune We Stopped Rewarding Illegals, Hou. CHRON., Aug. 29, 1993, at F1 (editorial) [here-
inafter Wilson]. Interestingly, Donald Huddle, in a companion editorial, noted that Gov.
Wilson was wrongly attributing all immigrant costs to the undocumented. Donald L. Hud-
dle, Debate Must Begin With True View of the Costs, Hou. CHRON., Aug. 29, 1993, at F1
(editorial) [hereinafter Huddle, True View.]
See also Huddle, supra note 274. But see Joel Kotkin, Immigrants Lead a Recovery,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1994, at A12 (immigrants in California substantially contributing to
California economic recovery).
341. Each of these groups was separated out for measurement purposes, but the data
were reported in a confusing way. First, there was no attempt to measure the context of
costs. Immigrants with children "cost" more than do immigrants without children, yet no
such comparative, contextual data are given. Moreover, the distributional data for several
agencies are not explained, (e.g., the calculations for property tax estimates), where rental
payments are not analyzed fully for their tax payments. For a brief reply to the LA County
study, see the Urban Institute response (Aug. 26, 1992), included in the study's appendix;
see also Greg Miller, Report Alleges Misleading Data on Immigrants to Los Angeles, Hou.
CHRON., Sept. 4, 1993, at A19; Barbara Vobejda, Study of Immigration in L.A. County
Challenges Government View of Costs, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1993, at A9 (study criticizing
L.A. County data). For an analysis of the particular problems faced by citizen children of
undocumented parents, see Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Chil-
dren of Undocumented Parents. 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 35 (1988).
342. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427 (West Supp. 1995). After an immigrant obtains permanent resi-
dence, a lawful "residence" is required. Residence is defined as "the place of general
abode.... [which is the alien's] principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to
intent." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(33) (West Supp. 1995). This requirement is not the "domi-
cile" that undocumented persons can acquire by abandoning their domicile in the native
permanent residents can, in most instances, become naturalized citi-
zens. 34 3 Therefore, this group was "thinned out" by post-1980 perma-
nent residents who chose to become citizens, and who would be
statistically indistinguishable from the citizen population.3 "4 In addi-
tion, aliens, who legalized their status, overlap with the first group, as
they have begun adjusting status through the amnesty provisions of
IRCA, after a brief classification period of Temporary Resident Sta-
tus. 345 By 1992-93, many of the persons had begun to naturalize.
Thus, one year after the Los Angeles County study, this group would
have begun to overlap with the citizen population. In addition, the
true 1992 undocumented population of Los Angeles County was esti-
mated to be 140,000 minors and 559,000 persons 18 or older, or 7.6%
of the total County population of 9.187 million persons.346 This group
was estimated to "cost" $308 million in County services, or approxi-
mately 10% of the total.347 Finally, citizen children of the undocu-
mented were also included as part of the "immigrant" population,
even though as U.S.-born residents they have all the rights accorded
other citizens.348
country on some other place that had been their domicile. See generally, Plyler, 457 U.S. at
227 n.22; Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983); Corson, supra note 46.
343. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427 (West Supp. 1995).
344. For example, The National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials'
response to the Los Angeles County Study, reproduced in the Study's appendix, was criti-
cal of this point:
The number of non-citizen foreign-born residents in the Los Angeles-Long Beach SMSA
as reported in the 1980 Census includes some number of undocumented immigrant resi-
dents of the SMSA who responded to the Census.- However, it also fails to include some
number of residents in the SMSA, the "undercount" of the 1980 Census; additionally, be-
cause legal permanent residents share some of the characteristics of those residents most
likely to be undercounted (for example, low income and education levels, fear of respond-
ing to the Census because of their own or other family members' immigration status, and
difficulties completing English-language questionnaires), the number of those un-
dercounted residents includes some number of legal permanent residents. On the national
level, according to estimates of demographers such as Warren and Passell, approximately
2.1 million undocumented immigrants were counted in the 1980 Census. However, the
total number of undocumented residents of the nation, approximately 2.6 million exceeded
the number of undocumented included in that Census. Consequently, we believe that at
the very least, the number of undocumented immigrants included in the 1980 Census figure
for non-citizen foreign born residents equals the number of legal permanent residents not
included in that same figure because of the undercount, and we believe that it is very likely
the number not included because of the undercount could even exceed the number of
undocumented who were included. Assuming, at the very least, that those two numbers
are equal, the 1980 Census figure for non-citizen foreign-born is a reasonable estimate of
the legal permanent resident population because the number of undocumented included in
that figure is offset by the number of legal permanent residents who are not included.
345. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a) ("Temporary Resident Status").
346. IMPACT, supra note 334, at 25 (Table 2).
347. Id. at 29.
348. See generally Piatt, supra note 341.
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The loose definition of "illegal alien" or "immigrant," including
such diverse groups as longtime permanent residents, intending citi-
zens, and actual citizens, renders the study less helpful in understand-
ing the true costs of the undocumented. For undocumented children,
presumably the most needy consumers of services and least likely tax
contributors, the study found only 117,000 welfare recipients in a
county population of 2.505 million children under the age of 18.349
The study's findings are consistent with other studies that showed vir-
tually no participation in welfare programs by the undocumented. For
example, in studies of California IRCA amnesty applicants, only 2%
of the formerly undocumented aliens had received welfare services,
1.2% had received general assistance, and 4.2% had received food
stamps. ° These data inflated the undocumented participation rates,
as they counted even citizen members of undocumented families as
undocumented. An Urban Institute reanalysis of the same LA
County data further throws doubt on the validity of the study, finding
that the 1992 County report overestimated costs by $140 million and
underestimated tax revenues paid by immigrants by $848 million.
35 1
To be sure, Governor Wilson and others are not arguing elegant
econometric models, arithmetic calculations, or fine-grained immigra-
tion status distinctions. Instead, he inaccurately lumped together vari-
ous immigration categories to inflate their social service participation
- as when he incorrectly averred that "two thirds of all babies born in
Los Angeles public hospitals are born to parents who have illegally
entered the United States. '3 2 In his most cynical discourse, he waxes
eloquent about how allocating resources to the undocumented de-
prives legally resident children of services. 3
349. IMPAcr, supra note 334, at 25 (Table 1). See Sam H. Verhovek, Stop Benefits for
Aliens? It Wouldn't Be That Easy, N.Y. TIMEs, June 8, 1994, at Al (noting complexity of
groups and regulations).
350. IMPACr, see supra note 334, at 33 (citing comprehensive Adult Student Assessment
System study; Westat study).
351. Jenifer M. Bosco, Undocumented Immigrants, Economic Justice, and Welfare Re-
form in California, 8 GEO. IMMIG. LJ. 71 (1994); Miller, supra note 341 (citing Urban
Institute study); Vobejda, supra note 341 (same).
352. Wilson, supra note 340, at F1 (proposing to eliminate eligibility for all public serv-
ices to undocumented). This figure vastly overstates the number of undocumented births
and misleadingly lumps together the variegated groups. For careful studies of this issue,
see San Diego Study, supra note 220, at 85-107. See also Leo R. Chavez, Wayne A. Corne-
lius, & Oliver W. Jones, Mexican Immigrants and the Utilization of U.S. Health Services:
The Case of San Diego, 21 Soc. Sci. MED. 93 (1985); JANET CALVO, IMMIGRANT STATUS
AND LEGAL AccEss TO HEALTH CARE (1993).
353. Wilson, supra note 340, at F1, F4. See Seth Mydans, California Trying to Bar Ser-
vice to Aliens, N.Y. TiMEs, May 23, 1994, at A10.
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The Los Angeles County data, whatever the assumptions and
data flaws, corroborate virtually all other studies conducted since the
1970's that measure undocumented alien benefit rates and tax contri-
butions.354 Julian L. Simon, one of the leading scholars in this field,
estimated in 1985 that undocumented aliens pay five to ten times
greater taxes than they consume in services.3 15  A 1984 study con-
ducted on Texas undocumented aliens showed a substantial net gain
of revenues over expenses,356 as did a California State Department of
Finance 1991-92 study357 and a 1990 U.S. Department of Labor
study.35 8 Virtually all the thorough and nonpartisan studies show the
same result.
359
354. More than most fields of study, this field is susceptible to bias. Every person,
whether young or old, documented or citizen, healthy or ill, is a composite of cross-subsidi-
zation, tax relief, subsidy, abatement, and social service. I certainly believe that substantial
quantitative skills should be brought to bear upon this problem of "economic costs," but I
do not believe very many people fully pay for their own "costs." Pay-as-you-go is a high
standard for the undocumented to bear, even though most studies show they do so. See,
e.g., Larry Rohter, Revisiting Immigration and the Open Door Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Septem-
ber 19, 1993, at 4E (reviewing competing claims).
355. See generally JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION
(1989) [hereinafter SIMON, CONSEQUENCES]; JULIAN L. SIMON, POPULATION MATTERS:
PEOPLE, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT, AND IMMIGRATION (1989) [hereinafter SIMON, POP-
ULATION MATTERS]; but see Huddle, supra note 274, at 4.
356. Sidney Weintraub, Illegal Immigrants in Texas: Impact on Social Services and Re-
lated Considerations, 18 INT'L. MIGR. REV. 733 (1984) (Texas). However, in 1994, Texas
was required to return $90 million in unexpended federal funds designed to reimburse the
state for costs of illegal immigration. James Cullen, Blame the Newcomers, TEX. OB-
SERVER, Aug. 19, 1994, at 2, 3.
357. COMPREHENSIVE ADULT STUDENT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM, A SURVEY OF THE
NEWLY LEGALIZED IN CALIFORNIA (1989). See DONALD HUDDLE, THE NET COSTS OF
IMMIGRATION TO TEXAS (1994) (finding substantial job displacement by aliens). See gener-
ally Leif Jensen, Patterns of Immigration and Public Assistance Utilization, 1970-1980, 22
INT'L MIGR. REv. 51 (1988).
358. MICHAEL GREENWOOD AND JOHN MCDOWELL, THE LABOR MARKET CONSE-
QUENCES OF U.S. IMMIGRATION: A SURVEY (1990).
359. See GEORGE BORiAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS (1990) (slight differences in welfare
benefits to immigrant families are due to location of aliens); GEFFREY PASSEL & MICHAEL
Fix, Myths About Immigrants, 95 FOR. POL. 151 (1994) (collective advantages of increased
immigrants); CHRIS HOGELAND AND KAREN RoSSEN, DREAMS LOST, DREAMS FOUND:
UNDOCUMENTED WOMEN IN THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY (1991) (Study of undocumented,
Latina women showing one quarter had citizen children eligible for AFDC but only 5%
received the welfare benefits for which their children were eligible); MARTA TIENDA AND
LEIF JENSEN, IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PARTICIPATION: DISPELLING THE
MYTH OF DEPENDENCY (1985) (refugees and immigrants participate in welfare plans with
less frequency than do natives); RICHARD VEDDER ET. AL., IMMIGRATION AND UNEM.
PLOYMENT: NEW EVIDENCE (1994) (de Tocqueville Institution study concluding that immi-
grants create jobs in the aggregate); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM
CONTROL AcT: REPORT ON THE LEGALIZED ALIEN POPULATION (1992) (Costs for health
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Careful scholars have even shown how entire markets are created
or restructured by immigrants, many of whom bring traditional Amer-
ican values of hard work, beliefs in family and achievement, and a
willingness to undertake tasks not considered attractive to U.S. work-
ers. For example, a recent housing study conducted in Houston re-
vealed that during the city's economic downturn of the early 1980's,
the overbuilt condominium, housing, and rental apartment industry
was kept from collapsing entirely by the influx of undocumented im-
migrant populations who were recruited to the formerly Anglo, mid-
dle class tenant markets.3 60 The former regimes of strict rules, limits
on the number of children, and restrictions on multiple-family housing
arrangements were relaxed or ignored in order to accommodate the
undocumented and other immigrant communities. In the late 1980's,
once the city rebounded and began to recover from its recession, an-
other market restructuring occurred, ratcheting the rules to be more
selective, raising rents to reconstitute the "mix" of the tenants, and
attracting more Anglo, higher income tenants.
3 61
The studies of the impact of immigration concentrate upon more
basic benefits of housing, welfare, health care, and elementary/secon-
dary education, with virtually no data on higher education participa-
tion. Those that do include data estimates or measure negligible rates.
For example, in San Diego, California's second largest city and largest
border community, a State Auditor study reported from CSU esti-
mates that only 86 students were undocumented, 85 at CSU-San Di-
ego and 1 at CSU-San Marcos.3 61 The CSU system overall estimated
as few as 1% and as high as 3% of their students on some campuses
were undocumented,363 while the more selective University of Califor-
nia system estimated that only 100-125 of their nearly 165,000 students
were affected by Bradford.36 The most accessible public system in
the State is the 110-campus, open admissions California Community
care for legalized aliens was reimbursed by U.S. government at half the rate reimbursed for
remainder of population); but see Huddle, Costs, supra note 274.
360. Nestor P. Rodriguez & Jacqueline Hagan, Apartment Restructuring and Latino Im-
migrant Tenant Struggles: A Case Study of Human Agency, 4 CoMPAR. URn. AND Commu-
err, REs. 164 (1992); see also Rodriguez, Economic Restructuring, supra note 319, at 101-
127; Nestor P. Rodriguez, Undocumented Central Americans in Houston: Diverse Popula-
tions, 21 INT'L MIGR. REv. 4 (1987).
361. Rodriguez and Hagen, supra note 360.
362. San Diego Study, supra note 220, at ix.
363. Id. at 218. In fact, these estimates were later determined to be extreme overesti-
mates. See, IMPAct, supra note 334, at 4-6.
364. See infra, Table 3.
College (CCC) System. Officials of that system estimated that fewer




By Campus by Citizenship Status
Noncitizen U.S. International
Campus U.S. Citizens Residents 366  Students367  Other368  Total
Berkeley 24,266 4,074 1,924 77 30,341
Davis 19,065 2,748 650 23 22,486
Irvine 12,347 3,796 497 175 16,815
Los Angeles 27,137 5,528 1,703 79 34,447
Riverside 8,339 62 263 13 8,677
San Diego 15,262 1,980 600 9 17,851
San Francisco 3,285 321 125 0 3,731
Santa Barbara 16,492 1,584 502 3 18,581
Santa Cruz 9,271 745 138 19 10,173
Total 135,464 20,838 6,402 398 163,102
Source: UC System Office data, February, 1994 (on file with author).
The small numbers of undocumented students involved and the
perceived inequity in denying them the benefits of residency had led
the California State Legislature to pass a BradfordlLeticia "A" bill
that would have resolved the issue and allowed the undocumented
students to establish domicile after a waiting period. Governor Wil-
son vetoed the bill, in a state where legislative overrides are extremely
rare.36 9 Some states have either settled lawsuits, 70 enabling the un-
documented to establish residency, or have determined without litiga-
tion that undocumented students who can meet all other residency
365. Press reports estimated that 14,000 or 1% of the 1.5 million total were undocu-
mented. See Libman, supra note 219.
366. "Noncitizen U.S. Residents" category includes students in the following categories:
permanent resident, refugee, amnesty recipient defined by INS, approved petitioner for
immigrant visa, awaiting immigrant visa number, political/religious asylee as defined by
INS.
367. "International Students" category includes students in the following visa
categories: Al, A2, A3, B1, B2, C1, C2, C3, El, E2, F1, F2, G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, H, Hi,
H2, H3, H4, I, J1, J2, K1, K2, L1, L2, Ml, and M2.
368. "Other" category includes students who: are in the process of establishing
permanent residency, but not currently maintaining a visa status (e.g., their former visa
status may have expired and permanent residency status is imminent so another visa is not
issued); are in the process of changing visa type where the initial visa has lapsed; have an
unusual visa type that the University generally does not track; have asked for but not yet
been granted political asylum; are undocumented; whose status is unknown.
369. See supra note 332.
370. See supra note 19 (Judith A, Alarcon cases in Arizona and Illinois).
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criteria may establish residence for tuition purposes. 371 Other states
and institutions treat this issue on an ad hoc, discretionary basis. For
example, one college treats undocumented students as residents if 1)
they were brought to the country surreptitiously by their parents, 2)
they otherwise are residing in the state for the requisite period of
time, and 3) they attended high school in the state. 72 This same
school excludes the undocumented who came on a visa but violated
the terms of the visa (e.g., for holding unauthorized employment while
in a tourist or student category).
V. Conclusion: The Discourse and the Danger
I have been actively involved in residency reform and study since
1975, when I was a doctoral student and campus recruiter at Ohio
State University. As a chicano student, I was drawn to recruit other
Latinos to campus, but in Ohio, the only communities with residents
of Mexican origin were located in the northern part of the state, where
tomatoes and other perishable crops were grown and processed. I dis-
covered that a number of talented Mexican American and Puerto Ri-
can farmworkers were interested in attending college, especially since
the tomato and pickle crops were being mechanized and Latinos were
not being hired in the canneries that ringed the northern border of the
state. However, each year these students and their families followed
the crops, from Texas onions up through the midwest vegetables to
tree fruits in Michigan. These travels meant they could not establish
residency in any state, even those at either end of the migrant stream
(such as Texas or Ohio) where they maintained a legal domicile. In
my typical graduate student way, I did not know the complexity of the
interstate residency systems, and so I asked, "why not?" I formed a
group of advocates in Columbus, and we convinced the state legisla-
ture and coordinating board to enact a change in Ohio law that ena-
bled agricultural workers to accumulate the residence period of twelve
months over the space of three years. 3  Breaking up the time period
371. The CCC system first faced this issue in a 1981 case, Gurfinkel v. Los Angeles
Community C. Dist., 175 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1981) and was considered to be bound by Brad-
ford 11, 225 Cal. App. 3d 972 (1990).
372. See e.g., supra note 28 (New York State). For an account of how undocumented
college students fare in New York, see Jeanine Amber, Illegal Ed- The High Cost of Going
to College, VILLAGE VoIcE, April 19, 1994, at 10.
373. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3333.31 (Anderson 1994) ("Rules for determining resi-
dence"); OHio AD N. CODE § 3333-1-10 (1994) ("Ohio student residency for state sub-
sidy and tuition surcharge purposes").
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seemed, in my amateur's way at the time, a fair way to allow these
farmworkers a chance at college.
To this day, I remember our big meeting with Ohio Board of Re-
gents officers. We showed them "Harvest of Shame," the classic Ed-
ward R. Murrow investigation into the plight of U.S. farmworkers.
Their biggest fear was that nonfarmworkers would pose as the new
"protected class" in order to avail themselves of this benefit. That
someone, not a migrant, would try and pass had never occurred to me:
not even Cesar Chavez had ever glamorized the profession enough to
make it fashionable. I whipped out an application I had brought in
my files, and showed the administrators what a migrant academic
transcript looked like: grading periods for the same 7 high schools, for
the same 4 weeks over each of 4 years. Once administrators saw the
transcript, once the discourse was in terms they could understand,
their concerns were allayed. When the migrant students were admit-
ted, they were entitled to other grants and curricular benefits as well,
and, through a formal interstate compact agreement, to residency ben-
efits in other reciprocal states.
374
This was my first professional taste of how benefits are accorded
by place and duration and my first high-level political success. In the
years since, I have established residency as my subfield of study, by
conducting research, litigating cases, serving on campus residency ap-
peals committees, 375 being an expert witness in residency cases. 6 In
an ironic twist, I was sued for my university committee's denial of the
residency appeal by one of my law students,377 and served both as a
hostile fact witness and expert in that case. I know residency.
But others do not, or they misperceive it. The undocumented
students at issue have met all admissions criteria, have met all tradi-
tional residence requirements, and displace no one. Except for the
different fee bills they receive, they are indistinguishable from other
college students. Even in California where 40% of all undocumented
residents are assumed to live, undocumented college students consti-
tute an almost invisible minority of students. The colleges have accus-
374. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3333.18 (Anderson 1994).
375. I have served on the University of Houston's Residency Appeals Committee since
its inception in 1987, and as a consultant to its University of Wisconsin counterpart during
my year there as a Visiting Professor of Law, 1989-90. Each institution considers hundreds
of appeals each year.
376. I have served as a witness or consultant to plaintiffs in the Leticia "A" cases, Brad-
ford cases, and the Alarcon case, and, with the help of several Texas colleagues, will try or
assist in trying a case challenging the Texas treatment of undocumented college students.
377. Smith v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Houston System, 874 S.W. 2d 706 (Tex.
App. 1994).
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tomed themselves to the students' presence, and, since 1985, have
administered their enrollment without incident - even though federal
financial aid funds are unavailable to this population.3 7 8 No study has
shown them to be a substantial number, even in border area colleges.
Through expert testimony and research, it is evident that the lure of
college is not a "pull" factor to attract illegal immigration.379
Although the Supreme Court has never faced the question
squarely, Toll v. Moreno,380 Plyler v. Doe,38' and a host of other resi-
dency cases38m make it clear that California cannot exclude long-term
undocumented aliens from establishing postsecondary residency if
they have met all the traditional tests for establishing domiciles. Even
as harsh an opinion as AAW concedes the students may be admitted
into colleges, albeit as non-residents. 383 Leticia "A" is a well-rea-
soned, careful opinion that grasps the essential issue. The California
Court of Appeals, early in 1995 ruled against the CSU System: Brad-
ford II rather than Leticia "A" is now California law.384 Further,
although litigation has tied up enforcement of Proposition 187, if it
were enforced, it would bar the undocumented from attending college,
even as nonresidents.
385
378. Between 1985 (Leticia "A") and 1990 (Bradford 1), the California Postsecondary
Financial Aid Commission allowed resident undocumented students to receive State
grants. However, as soon as Bradford I was decided, the Commission reversed itself and
ruled them ineligible. Interview with Rafael Magallan, Commissioner of Cal. Postsecon-
dary Financial Aid Commission in Washington, DC (June 12, 1992).
379. See supra note 266.
380. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
381. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
382. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
383. AAW, No. BC061221, slip op. at 4 ("The Plaintiffs herein do not seek to ban un-
documented aliens from attending CSU .... ").
384. AAW, 38 Cal. Rptr 15 (Call. App. 1995) (affirming Bradford 1).
385. Proposition 187 prompted a flurry of litigation in state and federal court to enjoin
the provisions that would have resembled those Texas had enacted, which were struck
down by Plyler. Ultimately, seven cases were consolidated and are now pending before a
federal district court in Los Angeles, California: five cases that had been filed in Los An-
geles and one that was transferred from Sacramento, challenging the constitutionality of
the Proposition, and Governor Wilson's state suit to force implementation of Proposition
187. The consolidation was challenged and the Ninth Circuit ruled, under a new provision
facilitating preliminary injunction appeal, that the district court had acted properly in ac-
cepting the cases and granting an injunction. Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 54 F.3d 599 (9th Cir.
1995) (retaining jurisdiction under Ninth Circuit Rule 3-3); Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 54 F.3d
1002 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court's preliminary injunction not an abuse of discretion).
This had the practical effect of enjoining virtually all the provisions of Proposition 187,
pending the federal trial, scheduled for late Fall, 1995.
In state court, four cases have been filed, three to enjoin the Proposition's provisions
concerning elementary and secondary education, and one to enjoin the postsecondary pro-
visions that would have barred the undocumented from attending California public institu-
But this analysis turns on whether objections to undocumented
alienage and higher education are rooted in careful research and ana-
lytic study. My reading of the discourse leads me to believe that the
David Bradfords of the world do not object on meritocratic or sub-
stantive grounds: Governor Wilson's objections that the money used
for serving undocumented aliens deprives lawfully resident aliens of
their benefits ring hollow, even as presidential politics. 386 Not only is
there considerable resistance even to permanent residents receiving
benefits - so much so that there is an entire legal literature devoted
to the topic 87 - but the imprecise, undifferentiated, and broad-brush
swipes at "illegals," "immigrants," and "aliens" generally tar all the
groups. One is reminded of how racist Japan-bashing led to the mur-
der of Vincent Chin, a Chinese-American. 38 Free-floating racial ani-
mus often leads to a generalized resentment against all people of
color, or "others." Governor Wilson has even been so mean-spirited
as to advocate a "repealing" of Plyler v. Doe3 89 and the constitutional
provisions that enable native born children to be U.S. citizens,390 irre-
spective of their parents' immigration status. All of these arguments,
mixed in a cauldron amidst shrill warnings about the rights of "real
Americans," lead inevitably to a sense of divisiveness, racial superior-
ity, and undifferentiated prejudice. In California, dozens of anti-alien
bills have been introduced,391 as if the aliens were the source of the
tions of higher education. These four cases have been consolidated into one court case,
pending hearings scheduled before Judge Stuart Pollack for Fall, 1995.
386. Wilson, supra note 340.
387. See supra note 20.
388. Vincent Chin, a Chinese-American died as a result of anti-Japanese sentiment,
when unemployed white autoworkers beat him to death: "It's because of you fucking Japs
that we're out of work!" See generally, Mari J. Matsuda, supra note 11 at 2330 n.55 (recit-
ing news stories on anti-Asian violence). Of course, his death would not have been excusa-
ble had he been Japanese, or a Japanese auto manufacturer. Professor Matsuda's well-
made point is that a climate of racist violence and intimidation leads to undifferentiated
violence and intimidation. Id. A recent study by a Quaker group similarly noted that most
border violence occurs against U.S. citizens and permanent residents of Mexican origin.
ROBERT KOULISH, ET. AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE BORDER INTERACrION PROJECr 22
(1994) (95% of respondents reporting mistreatment by Border Patrol were citizens or per-
manent residents).
389. David Lauter & John Broder, Clinton Differs with Wilson Ideas on Immigration,
L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 13, 1993, at Al.
390. Il; Gillam & Schwada, supra note 329, at A3.
391. Scott Armstrong, California Melting Pot Boils Over as Illegal Immigrants Enter
State, CHRIS. SCI. MONrrOR, Apr. 6, 1993, at 1 (describing legislative proposals); Frank
Acosta and Bong Hwan Kim, Race-Baiting in Sacramento, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1993, at B7
(describing "flood" of anti-alien bills in State Assembly).
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sputtering economy, even though government studies have shown that
immigrants - however defined - are net economic contributors.392
Much is made of the detrimental effects of immigration: that
criminals are not deterred from entering the country, that aliens are
stubbornly monolingual in languages other than English, that they
take jobs and services from citizens, that they undercut or depress
wages, that they do not understand the American character, that their
unlawful presence is itself a sign of an unwillingness to abide by rules
or accept responsibility for their actions.393 Of course, these traits, to
the extent that they are accurate, do describe some aliens in legal sta-
tus or in undocumented status, just as they surely describe some na-
tives. However, if there were a group that holds promise to become
productive, long-term residents and citizens, alien college students
would surely be that group. With the generally dismal schooling avail-
able to these students,394 that even a small percentage could meet the
extremely high standards of the University of California or moder-
ately high standards of the California State University is extraordi-
nary. Given their status and struggle, each represents a success story
of substantial accomplishment.
The truth is that the United States needs this talent pool. In
many highly technical fields, foreign scholars enroll in high numbers
and, after consuming the benefit, return to their countries.395 This is
as it should be, as learning respects no borders, and U.S. institutions
are surely enriched by recruiting internationally. However, the un-
documented have every incentive to remain in the United States, to
adjust their status through formal or discretionary means, and to con-
tribute to the U.S. economy and polity. My own experiences over the
years with these students are that they are extremely loyal to the
United States. Despite their undocumented status, many are more
Americanized than are most native born students. They believe in the
392. See supra notes 355-372 and accompanying text.
393. For an excellent analysis of this phenomenon in historical perspective, see RrrA
SIMON, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE IMMIGRANT: PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE, 1880-1980
(1985). See also, Maria L. Ontiveros, To Help Those Most in Need: Undocumented Work-
ers' Rights and Remedies Under Title VII, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 607 (1993-
94).
394. Latino students show poor educational achievement at virtually every level. See
generally, M. Beatriz Arias, The Context of Education for Hispanic Students: An Overview,
95 AM. J. OF EDUC. 26 (1986); LATINO COLLEGE STUDETrs (Michael A. Olivas ed., 1986).
For a useful compendium of such data, see JENNIFER DAY, POPULATION PRoJECTIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES, BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1993 TO 2050 (1993)
(Census population report).
395. CHANDLER, supra note 22; NAFSA, supra note 187.
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immigrant success story, having lived it in most instances. Some, like
"Jose" and "Manuel," the two students cited at the beginning of this
article, have literally never known any other life. Why deny these stu-
dents the benefit of resident tuition?
In my native New Mexico each year, Santa Feans ritualistically
burn Zozobra, or "Old Man Gloom," a 40-foot straw figure, to expiate
the year's accumulation of grief and indignities. Fiesta-goers are not
aware of their culture's sociological significance, and would be as-
tounded to find themselves the subject of an anthropologist's probing
of their community norms and mores. The inner logic of their acts of
expiation is not questioned or even manifest. They do it each year
because the community did it the year before. The celebration is
widely regarded as an Indian-Hispanic ritual, despite its origins in
Santa Fe's Anglo artist traditions. 96
After examining all the arguments raised by immigration restric-
tionists on the issues of undocumented college residence, I have come
to believe that those who raise objections, particularly those who act
upon these beliefs - the David Bradfords, FAIR members, conserva-
tive elected officials - do so to burn Zozobra and thus to expiate
their own fear and loathing of the unknown. Just as 19th century Cali-
fornia officials banned pigtails on prisoners and oppressed them
through a series of measures to keep Chinese immigrants in their
place,397 these storytellers have resorted to false stories and
scapegoating in their campaign to vilify immigrants. Their own data
show negligible undocumented participation in the state's vast higher
education system, far less than 1%. Unconcerned with the true data,
they have told tales out of school, of massive displacement and law-
lessness. Neither of these is true. On balance, immigrants, whether
lawfully admitted or undocumented, are present and future contribu-
396. For a sharp exchange on Zozobra and its meanings, see Michael A. Olivas, Torch-
ing Zozobra: The Problem with Linda Chavez, 2 RECONSTRUCrION 48 (1993) (review of
LINDA CHAVEZ, OUT OF THE BARRIO: TOWARD A NEw POLITICS OF HISPANIC AssiULA-
TION (1991)); Linda Chavez, A Response to Olivas 2 RECONSTRUCTION 182 (1993); Michael
A. Olivas, A Reply to Chavez, 2 RECONSTRUCTION 184 (1993).
397. This period, approximately 100 years ago, is widely regarded as the most overtly
racist period of U.S. immigration policy. In addition to the petty harassments directed at
Chinese workers, a more substantial federal legislative onus was directed at all Asians: the
"Chinese Exclusion" case. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). See
Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Ex-
clusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853 (1987); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Inter-
pretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545,550-54 (1990); Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grand-
father's Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 434-35 (1990).
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tors. California, for its part, benefits tremendously by their stories
and loyalties. Precluding their incorporation into California society
through higher education is a foolishly short-sighted policy, and those
who actively oppose the integration of long-term undocumented col-
lege students should be ashamed of themselves for their actions. Im-
portant public policy should not be premised upon such prejudice.
